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THE TERRORISM EXCEPTION TO ASYLUM: MANAGING
THE UNCERTAINTY IN STATUS DETERMINATION
Won Kidane*
The Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA "), as it must, excludes a terrorist
from receiving asylum. The substantive criteria, and the adjudicative procedures
set forth under the INA for the identification of the undeserving terrorist inevitably
exclude those who are neither terrorists nor otherwise undeserving. Such unin-
tended consequences are perhaps unavoidable in any well-conceived statutory
scheme. What is disconcerting is, however the margin of the possible error in the
application of this statutory scheme. Those who may be excluded by the application
of these provisions are often not those who are supposed to be excluded as terrorists.
Moreover, the existing scheme provides little help in screening out the real terrorists.
The Article demonstrates these flaws and proposes some substantive and proce-
dural modifications.
INTRODUCTION
This Article intends to demonstrate that the existing law pertain-
ing to the terrorism exception to asylum is overbroad, and as such
makes the adjudication of asylum unnecessarily complicated. It
further contends that the management of terrorism-related asylum
cases as apportioned among various federal agencies unduly as-
signs significant national security duties to immigration judges
without providing them meaningful resources. It argues that the
immigration judge's national security responsibility vitiates the ad-
judication of asylum cases, particularly when claimants possess
certain demographic characteristics that may be associated with a
propensity to commit acts of terrorism.' Accordingly, this Article
proposes amendment of some provisions of the applicable substan-
tive law to mitigate the over-breadth, as well as reassignment of
adjudicative duties in terrorism cases to appropriate agencies in
order to relieve the burden on immigration judges. This reassign-
ment would not only serve a national security purpose, but would
also disentangle the asylum system from terrorism issues, which
cannot be properly addressed in the immigration courts.
* Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Penn State Dickinson School of Law. I would
like to thank Professor Victor Romero for his valuable guidance on this and a number of
related projects.
1. These characteristics may include: age, gender, nationality, place of origin and re-
ligion.
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Part I of this Article provides a brief description of the historic
nexus between immigration and national security concerns, out-
lines the evolution of the concept of refugee status, in the United
States, and describes the sources of the existing law. Part II de-
scribes the current state of the law pertaining to various exceptions
to asylum, focusing in-depth commentary on the terrorism excep-
tion in particular, with a view toward demonstrating the serious
challenges that immigration courts face in adjudicating cases in-
volving terrorism issues. Finally, Part III proposes substantive
amendments and institutional reallocation of responsibilities.
I. IMMIGRATION AND PROTECTION OF NATIONAL SECURITY
This Part discusses the historical background and rationale for
the link between immigration regulation and national security
concerns and provides a brief overview of the evolution of the law
in this area with particular emphasis on post-9/11 changes.
Throughout much of the history of the United States, immigra-
tion regulation has been linked to matters of national security.2 As
early as 1798, Congress enacted the Alien and Sedition Act, author-
izing the President to detain and deport any alien whose real or
perceived affiliation with a foreign enemy of the United States
caused him or her to be considered a security threat. In 1882,
2. The history of immigration to America is remarkably complex with each era having
its own characteristics. See, e.g., A. Roger Ekirch, Bound for America: A Profile of British Convicts
Transported to the Colonies, 1718-1775, in CRIME & JUSTICE IN AMERICAN HISTORY: THE COLO-
NIES AND EARLY REPUBLIC 88, 92 (Eric H. Monkkonen ed., 1991) (describing the
transportation of convicts from England to the new world as one source of immigration, and its
implications); Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese
Exclusion and its Progeny, 100 HARv. L. REv. 853,855 (1987) (describing the role of conceptions
of national security and sovereignty in shaping U.S. immigration law and policy).
3. Alien and Sedition Act ofJune 25, ch. 57, 1 Stat. 570-72 (1798). This act is better
known for its restriction of free speech than of immigration. It had a chilling effect on
speeches protected by the First Amendment as it criminalized any "false, scandalous and
malicious" statement against the president, the government or Congress. See I Stat. 596-97,
§ 2. When Thomas Jefferson took the presidency from John Adams, during whose term the
law was passed, he pardoned those who had been convicted under the Act. See MICHAEL
LINFIELD, FREEDOM UNDER FIRE, 21 (1990) cited in Nancy Murrey & Sarah Wusnsh, Civil
Liberties in Times of Crisis: Lessons from History, 87 MASs. L. REv. 72, 74 (2002). Jefferson is
reported to have said the following regarding the Act: "[T]he friendless alien has indeed
been selected as the safest subject of a first experiment; but the citizen will soon follow, or
rather, has already followed, for already has a sedition act marked him as its prey." Original
Draft of the Kentucky Resolution (Oct. 1798), available at http://www.yale.edu/
lawweb/avalon/jeffken.htm cited in Nancy Murrey & Sarah Wusnsh, Civil Liberties in Times of
Crisis: Lessons from History, 87 MASS. L. REv. 72, 74 (2002). Although the Supreme Court
never specifically overturned the Act, in the 1964 decision of New York Times v. Sullivan it
indicated that the provisions of the Act would have been held to be inconsistent with the
First Amendment. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 276 (1964).
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Congress enacted the Chinese Exclusion Act,4 which prohibited
admission of persons of Chinese origin into the United States.
Cases resulting from the enactment of this legislation brought im-
migration into the national security context via the Plenary Power
doctrine.5
In Chae Chen Ping v. United States,6 the Supreme Court addressed
the constitutionality of the Chinese Exclusion Act and introduced
the plenary power doctrine into the immigration context for the
first time.' Chae Chen Ping, a Chinese laborer, came to the United
States under a treaty between China and the United States that
guaranteed admission of Chinese workers into the United States.
In 1880, a supplemental treaty was signed between the two nations
which allowed the United States to "regulate, limit or suspend"
Chinese immigration into the United States if their admission or
stay "affect[ed] or threaten[ed] to affect the interests of [the]
country, or [to] endanger the good order" of the United States
and its territories.9 In 1882, Congress authorized the suspension of
Chinese immigration for a period of ten years. It did make an ex-
ception for those already in the United States to leave and reenter,
provided that they obtained a certificate showing that they had
been initially admitted prior to 1880.10 Chae Chang Ping obtained
the required certificate in 1887 and traveled to China. While he
was in China, however, Congress enacted a prohibition against the
readmission of Chinese nationals, including those who had
4. An Act to Execute Certain Treaty Stipulations Relating to Chinese, ch. 126, 22 Stat.
58 (1882).. A series of other acts of the same effect followed: An Act to Amend an Act Enti-
tled "An Act to Execute Certain Treaty Stipulations Relating to Chinese," ch. 220, 23 Stat.
115 (1884); An Act to Supplement an Act Entitled "An Act to Execute Certain Treaty Stipu-
lations Relating to Chinese," ch. 1064, 25 Stat. 504 (1988); An Act to Prohibit the Coming of
Chinese Persons into the United States, ch. 60, 27 Stat. 25 (1892). These acts are cumula-
tively known as the Chinese Exclusion Act. See Henkin, supra note 2, at 855. Professor
Henkin suggests that some of the factors that prompted the enactment include economic
depression, unemployment, growing nativism, racism and xenophobia. Id. at 855-56. See also
Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law after A Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional
Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 550-51 (1990) (offering similar sugges-
tions.).
5. See Henkin, supra note 2, at 853-54. For a historical account of the Chinese Exclu-
sion era, seeT. ALEINKOFF & D. MARTIN, IMMIGRATION: PROCESS AND POLICY, 1-5 (1985).
6. Chae Chen Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889) (commonly known as The
Chinese Exclusion Case).
7. See id. at 604. For discussion of the plenary power doctrine, see generally Henkin,
supra note 2; Motomura, supra note 4.
8. The Treaty known as the Burlington Treaty was initially signed in 1868. It allowed
Chinese laborers access to the United States labor market. See Chae Chen Ping, 130 U.S. at
592-96.
9. See id. at 596.
10. Id. at 598-99.
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obtained a certificate before their departure." Ping challenged the
law on two grounds,'2 the more important one pertaining to Con-
gressional authority to enact the exclusion law.1 3 Since the
authority to regulate immigration is not among Congress's enu-
merated powers under the Constitution, 4 the legislature had to
look for authority from another clause. The Supreme Court ini-
tially attempted to find authority in the Commerce Clause, 5
although as leading scholar on human rights law Professor Luis
Henkin points out, immigration did not really "fit comfortably
within the commercial rubric." 6 He reasoned that:
[i]n those days at least, immigration largely was a matter of
individual choice rather than of commerce with foreign na-
tions; moreover, although the Constitution doubtless included
in commerce the "importation of persons"-a euphemism for
the slave trade-it was demeaning to lump the "huddled
masses yearning to breathe free" together with coal and
hides.
17
As justification under the Commerce Clause was so highly op-
posed, the Court had to seek another source of support for a
plenary Congressional power over immigration. The Court settled
on principles of sovereignty and national security'8 for that support
in an opinion that reads:
To preserve its independence, and give security against foreign aggres-
sion and encroachment, is the highest duty of every nation, and to
attain these ends nearly all other considerations are to be subordi-
nated. It matters not in what form such aggression and encroachment
come, whether from the foreign nation acting in its national character
or from vast hordes of its people crowding in upon us. The govern-
ment, possessing the powers which are to be exercised for
protection and security, is clothed with authority to determine
11. Id.
12. The first challenge was based on the 1880 treaty between China and the United
States which provided that Chinese laborers who were already in the United States could
leave and reenter if they obtained a certificate. The Supreme Court rejected this argument
on the ground that the 1888 Congressional Act, which prohibited the reentry, superseded
the treaty because it was later in time. See id.
13. Id. at 603.
14. The only textual guidance contained in the Constitution is the power to "establish
an uniform Rule of Naturalization." U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
15. Edye v. Robinson, 112 U.S. 580 (1884).
16. Henkin, supra note 2, at 856.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 857.
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the occasion on which the powers shall be called forth; and its
determinations, so far as the subjects affected are concerned,
are necessarily conclusive upon all its departments and offi-
cers. If, therefore, the government of the United States,
through its legislative department, considers the presence of
foreigners of a different race in this country, who will not as-
similate with us, to be dangerous to its peace and security,
their exclusion is not to be stayed because at the time there
are no actual hostilities with the nation of which the foreign-
ers are subjects. The existence of war would render the
necessity of the proceeding only more obvious and pressing.
The same necessity, in a less pressing degree, may arise when
war does not exist, and the same authority which adjudges the
necessity in one case must also determine it in the other. In
both cases its determination is conclusive upon the judiciary.' 9
This expansive view of national security, which includes the im-
migration of persons as a form of encroachment or invasion by
foreign countries, appears to have laid the foundation for the en-
during conflict between immigration and national security.
National security concerns took center stage following President
McKinley's assassination in 1903, and again in 1918 due to insecu-
rity created by World War 1.20 This unease prompted enactment of
the Anarchists Act2e ' which authorized deportation of "alien anar-
chists" and criminalized their reentry.2 Acting by authority of this
legislation and the Executive War Power, the President banished
somewhere between twelve and sixty-three hundred aliens of Ger-
man origin to internment camps.2 Those who were not so
confined were required to register and carry official permission if
they planned to travel anywhere.24
The period between the two World Wars also saw a resurgence of
enforcement actions against aliens because they were regarded as
threats to national security for ideological reasons.2 Immediately
19. The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889) (emphasis added).
20. Act of March 3, ch. 1012, §§ 2, 38, 32 Stat. 1213-14, 1221 (1903) (providing for ex-
clusion of "anarchists" and "subversives").





25. See Alexander Wohl, Free Speech and the Right of Entry Into the United States: Legislation
to Remedy the Ideological Exclusion Provision of the Immigration and Naturalization Act, 4 AM. U.J.
INT'L L & POL'Y 443, 450 (1989). For example, in 1919, about 3000 aliens were detained for
deportation following the bombing of the home of Attorney General Palmer. See JOHN
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preceding World War II, Congress enacted the 1940 Alien Registra-
tion Act.2 6 Soon thereafter, a combination of executive military
actions and legislative initiatives resulted in the internment of
hundreds of thousands of persons of Japanese descent on the West
Coast of the United States, regardless of their citizenship status."
The constitutionality of this action was upheld by the Supreme
Court on national security grounds in the case of Korematsu v.
United States.
28
In 1952, Congress enacted comprehensive immigration legisla-
tion, again grounded in national security interests. The
Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA")29 categorically excludes
aliens who may be entering the country to engage in such activities
as espionage, sabotage,0 or other subversive activities that are in-
herently "prejudicial to the public interest."3  Further, the INA
denies admission to aliens who have ever advocated for or been
affiliated with any organization that has supported certain anti-
government, especially anti-United States government, political
views, such as communism or anarchy.2 It also provided for sum-
mary exclusion of aliens posing "a menace to th[e] [n]ation's
security."
3 3
During the brief period of the 1980s, the United States enjoyed
an increased focus on humanitarianism. This allowed Congress to
pass the Refugee Act,3 4 which gave the 1967 United Nations Proto-
HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATTERNS OF AMERICAN NATIVIsM 1860-1925 230
(1963).
26. See Alien Registration Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 670 (1940) ("To prohibit certain subver-
sive activities; to amend certain provisions of law with respect to the admission and
deportation of aliens; to require the fingerprinting and registration of aliens; and for other
purposes.").
27. E.g. Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (Feb. 25, 1942); see also Act of March
21, 1942, 56 Stat. 173 (1942).
28. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219 (1944) (stating "[b]ut hardships are
part of war, and war is an aggregation of hardships. All citizens alike, both in and out of
uniform, feel the impact of war in greater or lesser measure. Citizenship has its responsibili-
ties as well as its privileges, and in time of war the burden is always heavier. Compulsory
exclusion of large groups of citizens from their homes, except under circumstances of direst
emergency and peril, is inconsistent with our basic governmental institutions. But when
under conditions of modern warfare our shores are threatened by hostile forces, the power
to protect must be commensurate with the threatened danger.").
29. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952)
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1537).
30. Id. at § 212(a) (29).
31. Id. at § 212 (a) (27).
32. Id. at § 212(a)(28) (B), (C), (G).
33. Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 219 (1953); see also Immigration and National-
ity Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 235(c), 66 Stat. 163, 199-200 (1952) (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1537).
34. Refugee Act, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980).
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col5 effect in the United States. The U.S. version also established
elaborate procedures for the adjudication of asylum . In 1987,
seemingly contrary to the previous exclusionary trend, the Su-
preme Court articulated standards of proof for discretionary grant
of asylum in the landmark case of INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca.
However, the United States did not completely cast aside its cau-
tionary stance. The Refugee Act delineates different categories of
persons whose members are excluded from protection even if they
meet the Protocol's definition of a refugee because they are either
considered to be undeserving of protection or because they pose a
national security threat. Specifically, an alien will be excluded if the
Attorney General determines that:
(i) the alien ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise partici-
pated in the persecution of any person on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group,
or political opinion; (ii) the alien, having been convicted by a
final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a
danger to the community of the United States; (iii) there are
serious reasons for believing that the alien has committed a
serious nonpolitical crime outside the United States prior to
the arrival of the alien in the United States; (iv) there are rea-
sonable grounds for regarding the alien as a danger to the
security of the United States."8
Following the Oklahoma City bombing in 1996, Congress again
responded to heightened concerns about terrorism by enacting
both the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
("AEDPA"), 39 and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act ("IIRIRA"). 4° These two laws further narrowed
the forms of discretionary relief available for certain categories of
persons and significantly expanded grounds for the exclusion and
deportation of aliens.4' The standards set by these enactments have
remained subjects of great controversy.42
35. See Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, January 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T 6223;
606 U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter Refugee Protocol].
36. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2000 & Supp. 2007).
37. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
38. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b) (2) (A) (2000 & Supp. 2007).
39. AEDPA, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (amended the INA).
40. IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (amended the INA).
41. See generally supra notes 38-39. The AEDPA defined more crimes, prescribed penal-
ties for crimes related to terrorism, enhanced law enforcement, and established a criminal
alien identification system. See AEDPA § (440)(e) (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (43)); see
also AEDPA § 323 (modifying the definition of providing material support for terrorism);
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The next wave of immigration reforms relating to national secu-
rity came after the horrific events of September 11, 2001.
A. Post 9/11 Immigration Reform: Combating Terrorism
Through Immigration Law
One of the first responses to the 9/11 terrorist attacks was the
enactment of the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism
Act of 2001, now commonly known as the PATRIOT Act. 3 Among
other things, the Act provided for intelligence gathering and shar-
ing and made significant modifications to the existing immigration
law, particularly as it pertains to exclusion and deportation of
aliens.4 Title IV of the PATRIOT Act is entirely dedicated to immi-
gration and border protection matters. It authorized the increase
of border patrol and customs and immigration personnel as well as
funding for new technology to aid enforcement.4 6 It further
granted the former Immigration and Naturalization Service
("INS") access to the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") files
to crosscheck the criminal records of those applying for immigra-
tion benefits. 7 Most importantly, it reformulated the immigration
• 48
law pertaining to terrorism.
§ 435 (expanding the criteria for deportation for crimes of moral turpitude, which courts in
the past had already interpreted liberally to include conduct such as provision of false in-
formation on a student loan application (see Kabongo v. INS, 837 E2d. 753, 758 (6th Cir.
1988)) or heterosexual sodomy (see Velez-Lonzano v. INS, 463 F.2d. 1305, 1307 (D.C. Cir,
1972)). See generally STEPHEN LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY, 433-
53 (2d ed. 1997). The AEDPA also provided for swift criminal alien removal procedures. See
§§ 431-43; see also § 705 (regarding increased penalties for certain terrorist crimes). The
objective, inter alia, was to "deter terrorism [and] provide justice for victims." Id. at 110 Stat.
at 1214. More importantly, the AEDPA also established unique procedures for the removal
of suspected terrorists. See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1158. The IIRIRA added to the list of crimes
previously considered to be aggravated felonies and also lowered the threshold penalty for
the qualification of a crime to be considered deportable. See IIRIRA, §321 (a) (A);
§ 101(a) (43) (A); § 321 (a)(3); § 101 (a) (43) (F)-(G) (lowering the penalty from five years to
one for crimes such as theft); §440(e)(4), (6); 8 U.S.C. § 101(a) (43) (P) (lowering the
prison sentence requirement of eighteen months for document fraud to twelve months.).
42. See, e.g., Terry Coonan, Dolphins Caught in Congressional Fishnets: Immigration Law's
New Aggravated Felons, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 589 (1998); Teresa A. Miller, Citizenship & Sever-
ity: Recent Immigration Reforms and the New Penology, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 611 (2003).
43. See Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) [hereinafter the PATRIOT Act]. The
Act was signed into law on October 26, 2001.
44. See id.
45. See generally id. at §§ 401-18.
46. See generally id. at §§ 401-405.
47. See id. at § 403.
48. For example, the PATRIOT Act expanded the definition of the term "engage in
terrorist activity." See id. at § 411.
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In 2005, Congress enacted the REAL ID Act, as part of the
Emergency Supplemental Appropriation Act for Defense, the
Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief.49 Although the REAL
ID Act was a part of the security-driven modifications of the immi-
gration law, the changes it introduced are largely limited to
evidentiary standards in asylum proceedings. 50 The PATRIOT Act
and the REAL ID Act provide the structure and substance of the
INA provisions pertaining to the adjudication of immigration
claims involving terrorism issues. These legislative enactments form
the basis of the current asylum law as it pertains to national security
and terrorism.
II. TERRORISM AS A STATUTORY BAR TO ASYLUM
This Part provides a detailed discussion of the complex statutory
scheme pertaining to the statutory bar to asylum with a particular
emphasis on the challenges of adjudication of cases involving the
terrorism issue.
A. Asylum Status in General
A textual review of certain INA provisions discussing terrorism
and asylum is necessary to demonstrate the difficulty of adjudicat-
ing cases involving terrorism issues. Section 208 of this statute is
exclusively devoted to asylum. The general rule is as follows: "Any
alien who is physically present in the United States or who arrives
in the United States ... irrespective of such alien's status, may ap-
ply for asylum in accordance with this [or certain other sections] .,5
With respect to conditions of granting asylum, the INA states that,
"The Secretary of Homeland Security or the Attorney General may
grant asylum to an alien who has applied for [it] in accordance
with the requirements and procedures established by [either of
them] if [either] determines that such alien is a refugee within the
meaning of Section 101 (a) (42) (A) of this title."5 This section de-
fines a refugee as "any person who is outside any country of such
49. Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 [hereinafter the REAL ID Act].
50. For example, the REAL ID Act makes the following clarification with respect to a
very controversial issue of the standard of proof in asylum proceedings: "Where the trier of
fact determines that the applicant should provide evidence that corroborates otherwise
credible testimony, such evidence must be provided unless the applicant does not have the
evidence and cannot reasonably obtain the evidence." INA § 208(a) (2) (B) (ii).
51. INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1) (2000 & Supp. 2007).
52. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A).
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person's nationality or ... in which such person last habitually re-
sided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to ... [or] avail
himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of per-
secution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion."53
This Article is focused on the exceptions to this definition, par-
ticularly with respect to the terrorism exception to asylum.
B. Exceptions to Asylum
The INA excludes some category of persons from protection
even if they otherwise meet the requirements of refugee status.5
4
The primary reason for these exceptions is that these categories of
persons are deemed "undeserving" or "unworthy" of protection.
Section 208(b) (2) (A) of the INA sets forth the various exceptions
that prevent otherwise qualified applicants from being granted asy-
lum in the United States, 5- including, (1) persecution of others, (2)
particularly serious crimes, (3) serious non-political crimes, and
(4) danger to the security of the United States. The INA's exclu-
sion provisions somewhat parallel the exclusion provisions of the
Refugee Convention, with the exception of the terrorism excep-
• 56
tion. The jurisprudence pertaining to almost all of the statutory
bars is inextricably linked with the jurisprudence of the terrorism
exception. As such, brief discussions of the various statutory bars
53. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (42) (A). Asylum is one of three interrelated forms of relief that
an alien could seek under the INA. The second form of relief is called withholding of re-
moval under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b) (3) ("[T]he Attorney General may not remove an alien to a
country if the Attorney General decides that the alien's life or freedom would be threatened
in that country because of the alien's race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion."). Unlike asylum, which is purely discretionary, withhold-
ing of removal under this provision is mandatory. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421
(1987). The third form of relief that an alien could seek falls under the Convention against
Torture; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, entered into force June 26, 1987, 1465 U.N.TS. 85. This was implemented
through the Omnibus Consolidation and Emergency Supplemental Appropriation Act of
1999, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 2242, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-822 and Regulations Concerning the
Convention Against Torture, 9 C.F.R. § 208.16-208.18 (2005). For purposes of asylum, the
INA further provides that: "The burden of proof is on the applicant to establish that the
applicant is a refugee, within the meaning of section 1101 (a) (42) (A) of this title. To estab-
lish that the applicant is a refugee within the meaning of such section, the applicant must
establish that race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion was or will be at least one central reason for persecuting the applicant." 8 U.S.C.
1158(b) (1) (B) (i).
54. See supra Part II.A.
55. See, e.g., DEBORAH ANKER, THE LAW OF ASYLUM 415 (Paul Lufkin ed., 1999).
56. Id. at 442-43.
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precede a detailed discussion of the terrorism bar in the following
subsections.
1. Persecution of Others
An alien will be barred from receipt of asylum protection if he
has "ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the
persecution of any person on account of race, religion, nationality,




This determination is subject to the "clear and convincing evi-
dence" standard of review.58 The court will consider the claimant's
own testimony and other relevant facts to determine whether he or
she had, at some time in the past, engaged in the persecution of
others. Misconduct that might constitute persecution of others
has been subject to complex and varying standards imposed by the
BIA and various appellate courts. For example, the BIA at one
point found that while torture6° and assassination6 1 constituted per-
secution of others, acts of violence incidental to armed conflict did
not.62 On a different occasion, it held that involuntary or forced
involvement in the persecution of others does not excuse the
claimant,63 stating that what is important is not the state of mind of
57. 8 U.S.C. 1158(b)(2)(A)(i) (2000 & Supp. 2007). This exception seems to have
been derived from the exclusion clauses of the Refugee Convention and has been modified
to suit the needs of the United States government. Compare Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees of 1951, entered intofoere April 22, 1954, ch. 1, art. 1 (F), 189 U.N.T.S. 150
[hereinafter Refugee Convention] ("The provisions of this Convention shall not apply to
any person with respect to whom there are serious reasons for considering that (a) He has
committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity, as defined in
the international instruments drawn up to make provision in respect of such crimes; (b) He
has committed a serious non-political crime outside the country of refuge prior to his ad-
mission to that country as a refugee; (c) He has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes
and principles of the United Nations.") with 8 U.S.C. 1101 (a)(42) (2000 & Supp. 2007). The
Refugee Convention was geographically limited to Europe and temporally limited to pre-
1951 events. The Refugee Protocol in 1967 eliminated these limitations but incorporated all
of the substantial provisions by reference, including the Convention's definition of a refu-
gee. Although the United States was not an official party to the Refugee Convention, it
became one by proxy when it ratified the Protocol in 1967.
58. McMullen v. INS, 788 F. 2d 591 (9th Cir. 1986).
59. Id. at 599.
60. See, e.g., Ofosu v. McElroy, 933 F. Supp. 237, 244-46 (9th Cir. 1995) (upholding
BIA's decision relating to torture.).
61. See, e.g., McMullen v. INS, 19 I. & N. Dec. 90,92-93 (BIA 1984), affd, 788 F.2d 591,
599 (9th Cir. 1986).
62. See Rodriguez-Majano, 19 1. & N. Dec. 811,816 (BIA 1988).
63. See Laipenieks v. INS, 18 1. & N. Dec. 433, 464-65 (BIA 1983); rev'd, 750 F 2d 1427,
1435 (9th Cir. 1985).
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the claimant when he committed the acts but the "objective effect"
of the conduct.
64
The difficulty of determining asylum claims under the existing
system is evidenced in the Matter of A-H-,65 wherein the BIA de-
termined that once the government presents prima facie evidence
showing that the claimant had engaged in persecution of others,
the burden then shifts to the claimant to demonstrate by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that he did not engage in the said
conduct.66 In this case, the respondent was an Algerian national
and citizen.67 Admittedly, he was a leader-in-exile of a political Is-
lamic group best known by its French acronym "FIS,"6 which came
into conflict 6 in 1992 with the Algerian government. A military
branch of this group known as AIS was involved with terrorist ac-
tivities.7 0 The respondent fled Algeria as the conflict erupted,
entered the United States and applied for asylum in 1993.7' Three
years later, the INS denied his claim on the ground that the re-
spondent was complicit in persecution of others and acts of
terrorism based on his affiliation with FIS.72 After an immigration
judge affirmed the Service's decision and ordered him deported,73
the BIA reversed the decision on the ground that there was no suf-
ficient evidence to conclude that the respondent was excludable
because of the alleged acts and remanded the case to the immigra-
tion court for further proceedings. 4
The second immigration judge, upon consideration of addi-
tional evidence, decided that the respondent was excludable on
the same ground as found by the previous judge. 75 After a second
appeal to the BIA, the deportation decision was reversed yet again
on grounds of insufficient evidence and questionable credibility of
the judge's determination 6 and the respondent was granted asy-lum in the United States.77
64. Id.
65. In reA-H-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 774 (AG 2005).
66. Id. at 786.
67. Id. at 775.
68. Id.
69. Id. 775-76.
70. Id. at 776.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 776-77.
74. Id. at 777 (citing In re A-H- (BIA 1998)).
75. Id. at 777 (citing In re A-H- (I.J. 1999)). The second judge granted the respondent
deferral of removal under CAT and implementing legislation. See supra note 53.
76. Id. at 777-78.
77. Id. at 777 (citing In reA-H- (BIA 2000)).
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Dissatisfied with the BIA's repeated reversal of the immigration
judges' decisions, the acting director of the INS referred the BIA's
decision directly to the Attorney General, who considered the mat-
ter in detail and reversed the BIA's decision. Although the
respondent denied personal involvement in terrorist activities, he
did admit that he supported the military wing's actions before
1995.78 This evidence, combined with newspaper reports illustrat-S 79
ing his sympathies, convinced the Attorney General that the
respondent was sufficiently engaged in persecution of others to
exclude him from asylum protection. Examples of evidence that
could support a finding that a person who is a leader-in-exile of a
political movement may be found to have "incited," "assisted," or
"participated in" acts of persecution would include evidence indi-
cating that the leader was instrumental in creating and sustaining
the ties between the political movement and the armed group and
was aware of the atrocities committed by the armed group, evi-
dence that he used his profile and position of influence to make
public statements that encouraged those atrocities, or evidence
that he made statements that appear to have condoned the perse-
cution without publicly and specifically disassociating himself and
his movement from the acts of persecution, particularly if his
statements appear to have resulted in an increase in the persecu-
tion. These examples are not intended to be exhaustive.0
Finding this standard problematic, however, the Ninth Circuit
articulated a completely different standard in Miranda Alvarado v.
Gonzales.8' In this case, the court said that to determine whether the
person should be excluded from refugee status as a persecutor of
others, two criteria must be met, (1) a particularized showing that
78. Id. at 781. The group was responsible for several terrorist acts and the death of ci-
vilians. The respondent was quoted by a French newsletter as saying, "The GIA exists in the
media. They must stop using this terminology and talk instead of the Mujahidin .... We are
finally supporting the struggle of the Mujahidin." He was also quoted by another newspaper
as saying, "the rumors about disagreement or conflict between the [AIS] and [GIS] are
mere illusions for 'the Mujahidin have the same war and the same peace, and they are all
from the womb of the FIS."' Id.
79. Id. For example, an affiliate of The Economics reported the respondent's comment
that FIS would pursue armed struggle in Algeria to depose the "junta in power" and his
suggestion that intellectuals affiliated with the government would be targeted. Id. Interest-
ingly, around the same time that the respondent made these statements, five Algerian
intellectuals were killed. Id. Additionally, in an interview with Agence France-Presse follow-
ing one such assassination, the respondent said that the assassination was a "sentence and
not a crime." Id. at 785.
80. Id.
81. Miranda Alvarado v. Gonzales, 441 E3d 750, 761-62 (9th Cir. 2006).
SPRING 2008]
HeinOnline  -- 41 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 681 2007-2008
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
the claimant was personally involved, and (2) that the claimant's
involvement was material.2
The A-H- case demonstrates the overlap between the "persecu-
tion of others" and the "terrorism" exceptions to asylum. While the
bar against persecution of others applies to the conduct of the re-
spondent in the past, the terrorism bar focuses not only on past
conduct but also the future likelihood of involvement in terrorist
activity. Moreover, as will be discussed below, the evidentiary issues
involved with the terrorism exception are more complicated than
those involved with the persecution of others cases. In fact, the in-
volvement of the A-H- case with terrorism issues is precisely what
complicates the case. The main issue in a case involving the bar
against persecution of others is whether the respondent had en-
gaged in persecution of others in the past. By contrast, the judge in
a terrorism case only has to be concerned about the future likeli-
hood of engagement in terrorist activity.
2. Particularly Serious Crimes
The second category of persons that the INA excludes from
refugee status includes any alien who "[has] been convicted by a
final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitut[ing] a
danger to the community of the United States."8 3 As the text of this
provision clearly indicates, this exclusionary ground is exclusively
limited to criminal convictions in the United States. Originally de-
signed to be a preemptive exclusionary provision, it is now more
often used to terminate refugee status when the refugee commits
"a particularly serious" crime after he has been granted asylum. 4
Under the INA, "aggravated felon [ies]," consisting of theft and
perjury accompanied by a prison term of more than 1 year,8 5 are
considered such particularly serious crimes within the meaning of
82. Id. This determination affirmed the ruling of twenty years prior in Laipenieks v. INS,
750 F.2d 1427, 1431-32 (9th Cir. 1985) (demanding "proof of personal active assistance or
participation in persecutoral acts.") Other Circuits have taken a different view and the Su-
preme Court has denied certiorari. See, e.g., Kulle v. INS, 825 F.2d 1188 (7th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 1042 (1988); Schellog v. INS, 805 F.2d 655 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481
U.S. 1004 (1987) (holding that voluntary association with Nazi SS commando was a suffi-
cient ground for exclusion even though a personal involvement in persecutory conduct
could not be proven).
83. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b) (2) (A) (ii) (2000 & Supp. 2007).
84. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (c) (2) (B) ("Asylum ... may be terminated if... the alien meets
a condition described in subsection (b) (2) of this section.").
85. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (43) (G) ("A theft offense (including receipt of stolen
property) or burglary offense for which the term of imprisonment [is] at least 1 year.").
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the Refugee Act. s6 The criteria for determining what constitutes a
conviction of a particularly serious crime is as follows: 87 (1) the na-
ture of the conviction, (2) the underlying facts and the
circumstances of the conviction, (3) the nature of the sentence
given, and (4) evaluation of the circumstances of the commission
of the crime to determine if the convict could be a danger to the
community.88 The BIA's clear stance on this final requirement is
disturbing. In the Matter of Q-T-M-T,89 it held that once it is deter-
mined that the respondent had, in fact, committed a particularly
serious crime, an independent determination of whether he is also
a danger to the community is unnecessary.90 Appellate Courts have
overwhelmingly endorsed the BIA's position on this issue.9' This
indicates that courts are far more interested in determining
whether respondents are deserving of protection rather than
whether there would be significant backlash if he or she were to
remain in the United States. In fact, the BIA has simplified the
standard of proof by limiting the inquiry to the actual records of
the conviction without going "behind the record of conviction to
redetermine the alien's innocence or guilt."
292
Therefore, the adjudication of cases involving this provision is
restricted to just two inquiries: (1) the sufficiency of the conviction
records to prove that the alleged conviction actually existed, and
(2) whether the alleged crime constituted "a particularly serious
crime" within the meaning of the statute. Since examination of
court records often reveals telling details about the nature of the
crime, the evidentiary issues involved in adjudication of the exis-
tence of a conviction are relatively slight as opposed to those
involved with all other grounds of exclusion. The legal standards
involved in the determination of the nature of the crime could,
however, be problematic. Even though there is detailed statutory
86. A per se rule sates that: "Conviction of aggravated felony-For purposes of clause
(ii) of subparagraph (A), an alien who has been convicted of an aggravated felony shall be
considered to have been convicted of a particularly serious crime." 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(2)(B)(i). For the definition of an aggravated felony, see generally 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101 (a) (43).
87. In re L-S-, 22 1. & N. Dec. 645 (BIA 1999).
88. Id. at 650-51; see also In re Frentescu, 18 1. & N. Dec. 244, 247 (BIA 1982).
89. In re Q-T-M-T, 21 1. & N. Dec. 639 (BIA 1996).
90. Id. at 655-56; see also In reC-, 20 I. & N. Dec. 529 (BIA 1992); In re U-M-, 20 I. & N.
Dec. 327 (BIA 1991).
91. See, e.g., Al-Salehi v. INS, 47 F.3d 390 (10th Cir. 1995); Kofa v. INS, 60 F.3d 1084
(4th Cir. 1995); Garcia v. INS, 7 F.3d 1320 (7th Cir. 1993); Martin v. INS, 972 F.2d 657 (5th
Cir. 1992).
92. In re L-S-, 22 1. & N. Dec. 645, 651 (BIA 1999).
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guidance in this respect and a per se rule 93 provided by the INA,
the application could be problematic.
One example of the difficultly an immigration judge could face
in adjudicating this provision is whether a respondent who plead
guilty to theft and received an indeterminate sentence qualifies as
an aggravated felon. "[A] theft offense (including receipt of stolen
property) or burglary offense for which the term of imprisonment
at least one year"9 4 is considered an aggravated felony. Therefore,
whether a crime of theft is considered an aggravated felony turns
on whether the sentence spans more than one year. However, this
is not always a simple determination since the judge has to rely on
the criminal court record, which may not be clear as to whether an
indeterminate range of months was an actual sentence, a sus-
pended sentence, probation or parole.95
3. Serious Non-political Crimes
The INA also excludes an alien from protection if "there are se-
rious reasons for believing that the alien has committed a serious
nonpolitical crime outside the United States prior to [his] arri-
val... in the United States." 6 The standard of proof for this
exclusion is equivalent to the "probable cause" standard.97 Barapind
v. Enomotos illustrates what circumstances might constitute prob-
able cause in this context. In this case, the Indian government
requested extradition of an Indian national for allegedly driving a
vehicle in India while a gunman riding with him committed mur-
93. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (b) (2) (B) (i) (2000 & Supp. 2007). A different standard applies
when a mandatory withholding of removal is sought under INA 241 (b) (3). Compare 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b) (2) (A) (i)-(iv) with 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (2) (A)-(D).
94. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (43) (G) (2000 & Supp. 2007).
95. See ANKER, supra note 55, at 13-414, 441. When it is clear that the indeterminate
sentence was a sentence that was actually imposed and later suspended in the form of pa-
role, the maximum penalty is often considered to be the actual sentence rather than the
minimum. See, e.g., Pichardo v. INS, 104 E3d 756, 759 (5th Cir. 1997); Rogers v. Pa. Bd. of
Prob. & Parole, 724 A.2d. 319 (Pa. 1999).
96. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(iii) (2000 & Supp. 2007). This provision was adopted
almost verbatim from the Refugee Convention. See Refugee Convention, entered into force 22
April, 1954, 189 U.N.T.S. 150, at art. l(F)(b) (stating that a refugee is excluded from refu-
gee status if there are serious reasons for considering that he "has committed a serious non-
political crime outside the country of refuge prior to his admission to that country as a refu-
gee.").
97. McMullen v. INS, 788 E2d 591, 599 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that clear and con-
vincing evidence is not required); see also Barapind v. Enomoto, 400 F.3d 744 (9th Cir. 2005)
(partly overruling McMullen.).
98. Barapind, 400 F.3d at 744.
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der and caused several injuries.99 For evidence to be sufficient to
support probable cause, it must be "competent."'100 As evidence,
Indian officials relied on the translated statement of a man who
was wounded in the shooting incident 1 that identified the re-
spondent as the driver. Respondent, on the other hand, submitted
another affidavit made by the same individual, claiming that he
had never seen the respondent driving the vehicle. Despite these
blatant inconsistencies, 2 the court held that the evidence sup-
ported the existence of probable cause and ordered that the
credibility of the affidavit be tested at trial.
10 3
Secondly, there was a question of whether the alleged crime was
political in nature. The circumstances suggested that the alleged
crime occurred during a time of serious political violence during
which tens of thousands of people were killed.0 4 Moreover, evi-
dence suggested that the respondent was a prominent political
leader.10 5 On this basis, the court remanded the case for further
proceedings to determine if "[there was an] occurrence of an up-
rising or other violent political disturbance at the time of the
charged offense, and [whether the] charged offense ... is 'inci-
dental to' 'in the course of,' or 'in furtherance of the uprising." '
Although consideration of the "political offense" exception has
proven instructive in extradition cases,' °7 courts have added more
perspective in the immigration context. For example, in McMullen
v. INS,'Os the Ninth Circuit stated that the most appropriate test in
the immigration context looks at the subject's motivation, whether
there is a direct link between the crime and an alleged political
objective, and whether it is proportional to the objective sought
and the level of its atrociousness.'00
McMullen also demonstrates the link between the "serious non-
political crimes" bar and the terrorism bar. McMullen was a former
99. Id. at 746-48. His asylum request was interrupted when India requested his extra-
dition, alleging the crimes that he had committed were non-political. Id. at 747.
100. Id. at 749.
101. Id.
102. The affidavit that Barapind obtained from the same individual stated that the In-
dian police had him sign a blank piece of paper and turned it into an affidavit accusing
Barapind of complicity in the crime. Id.
103. Id. at 750.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 747, 750.
106. Id. at 750 (citing Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 797 (9th Cir. 1986)).
107. See, e.g., Ornelas v. Ruiz, 161 U.S. 502, 509-12 (1896); McMullen v. INS, 788 F.2d
591,594 (9th Cir. 1986); Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 782-83 (9th Cir. 1986).
108. McMullen, 788 F.2d at 591.
109. Id. at 594.
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member of the Provisional Irish Republican Army ("PIRA")." As a
member, he was involved in militant activities that included bomb-
ing military installations, training operatives, and coordinating
illegal arms shipments from the United States to Ireland to support
PIRA's terrorist activities.' From the outset, the court noted that
the record left no room for doubt that the PIRA was a terrorist or-
ganization because it was involved in indiscriminate targeting of
civilians no matter what the objectives might have been. 2 The dif-
ficult question was whether there were serious reasons to believe
that McMullen was involved in the indiscriminate attacks.1
3
McMullen admitted that he was involved in bombing military in-
stallations and in shipping arms, but denied any involvement in
other types of terrorist activities in which the PIRA was implicated.
The Court stated that, "[O]nce the conduct is determined to be a
serious nonpolitical crime, the Convention requires only a finding
of probable cause to believe the alien has committed the crime in
order to find 'serious reasons.'1 4 The court then concluded that
the totality of the circumstances, including his admission of par-
ticipation in serious military activities, shipment of arms, and
training of PIRA members, supported the conclusion that there
was probable cause or "serious reason" to believe that McMullen
had committed serious non-political crimes associated with the
PIRA." -5
Although insufficient and often nonexistent evidence presents
serious problems in cases involving serious non-political crimes,
these cases are actually slightly easier to adjudicate than ordinary
terrorism cases since a defined standard of proof for non-political
crime cases provides at least some framework for the court. Such
definitional clarity is entirely lacking in terrorism cases.
110. Id. at 592-93.
111. Id. at 593.
112. The court stated specifically that:
Terrorism does not fit easily into the complex rubric of international law,... and it is
difficult to distinguish meaningfully between one obviously terrorist act and another.
However, there is one relevant distinction that has maintained legal force for many
years, and which applied in this case. There is a meaningful distinction between ter-
rorist acts directed at the military or official agencies of the state, and random acts of
violence against ordinary citizens that are intended only "to promote social chaos."
The distinction between acts against ordinary civilians and official instrumentalities
has been extant in the common law since In iv Meunier, 2 Q.B. 415 (1894).
Id. at 597.
113. Id.at599.
114. Id. (citing Grant v. Sindona, 619 F.2d 167, 174 (2d Cir. 1980)).
115. Id. (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230 (1983)) (articulating the totality of
circumstances test for probable cause).
[VOL. 41:3
HeinOnline  -- 41 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 686 2007-2008
The Terrorism Exception to Asylum
4. Danger to the Security of the United States
A person seeking asylum is also excluded from receiving protec-
tion if, "there are reasonable grounds for regarding the alien as a
danger to the security of the United States.""' Since this security
bar is quite general, its application is often linked to another ex-
clusionary ground, namely the terrorism exception. The case of
Azzouka v. Sava'17 questions the grounds under which a person can
be labeled as a danger to U.S. security.
Azzouka, a national of Yemen of Palestinian origin, was detained
at a port of entry while attempting to enter the United States.""
Although he possessed a valid passport and visa, port inspectors
found two fraudulent passports in his possession and detained
him." 9 He was charged with criminal offenses related to possession
of the fraudulent documents, 20 which were later dismissed because
he agreed to provide information about the Palestinian Liberation
Organization ("PLO"), 2' where he claimed to have worked as a
clerk and driver. He denied any involvement in terrorist activities.
After the criminal charges where dropped, he asked to present an
asylum claim, professing that he would face persecution if he re-
turned to his place of origin.'12 Rather than being adjudicated by
an immigration judge, an INS Regional commissioner summarily
excluded Azzouka on national security grounds. Azzouka then
sought a habeas corpus review of this decision, questioning
whether the INS commissioner was the appropriate person to de-
cide his case. He claimed he had been denied an opportunity to
have his case adjudicated by the Immigration Judge.' 23 Simply
stated, the most important issue in this case was whether an asylum-
seeker had a right to have his asylum claim adjudicated by an im-
migration judge when the INS Regional Commissioner summarily
decided that he posed a national security threat. 124 The Second
Circuit reviewed two provisions of the INA. 25 The court stated in
an elaborate ruling that:
116. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(iv) (2000 & Supp. 20007).
117. Azzouka v. Sava, 777 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1985).
118. Id. at 69-70.
119. Id. at 70.
120. The charge was brought in the Eastern District of New York. Id. The specific crimi-
nal charges were violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1543 (1982) (" 'willful use' of false passport"). Id.
The charges were later amended and brought under 18 U.S.C. § 545 (1982) ("prohibiting
passing false papers through the customhouse"). See id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 71.
124. Id. at 71-75.
125. Id.
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All we need decide is that if the Regional Commissioner has
reasonable grounds for regarding an alien as a danger to the
security of the United States, [the alien] not only may be ex-
cluded as an undesirable alien but also is not entitled to an
asylum hearing. We find that the Regional Commissioner is
the appropriate official to make the national security deter-
mination and not the immigration judge.2
6
The court based this conclusion on the following reasons: (1) an
asylum hearing should only determine if the claimant has a well-
founded fear of persecution, (2) Congress did not intend to
amend the statutes regarding the summary exclusion of those who
threaten national security by offering a new asylum hearing in
which the security issue could be aired, and finally, (3) under sec-
tions 243(b)(2) and 235(c) the authority to determine security
threats is given to the Attorney General and the Regional Commis-
sioner as the Attorney General's designee. 27 If they determine that
128
a security threat exists, no separate asylum hearing is necessary.
If the INS determines that an alien is a danger to national secu-
rity, he or she may seek habeas corpus review. If none of the
exceptions apply, the asylum-seeker is entitled to a hearing on his
asylum petition. The habeas corpus remedy remained in effect un-
til the enactment of the REAL ID Act of 2005, which stripped
district courts of habeas jurisdiction to review final deportation or-
ders.
2 9
Normally, qualification for asylum status is a two-part process in-
volving qualification as a refugee by definition and then possible
exclusion. Then, a determination must be made as to whether the
applicant will be excluded from protection for some other reason,
even though he meets the technical definition of a refugee. The
126. Id. at 75.
127. Id. at 75-76.
128. Id. at 76. The Court distinguished this ruling from its former ruling in Yiu Sing
Chun v. Sava, 708 E2d 869 (2d Cir. 1983). In Chun, the Court had held that asylum hearings
cannot be denied simply because the statute does not provide for an exclusion or deporta-
tion hearing. Id. at 870-72. Chun involved two stowaways who requested political asylum,
which was denied by an INS District Direct. Id. at 869. The aliens sought a habeas corpus
review but their request was denied by the District Court. Id. at 872. The Second Circuit
reversed the district court's ruling and held that even if the claimants were deemed exclud-
able under the general provision of 8 U.S.C. § 1332(d), the Refugee Act provides that aliens
may seek asylum "irrespective of ... their status." 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (2000). Therefore, a
hearing before an immigration judge to determine whether they qualify for asylum cannot
be denied. Chun, 708 E2d at 877. The court distinguished Azzouka on the ground that while
Congress did not specifically and expressly exclude stowaways from asylum, it did so with
respect to persons considered security threats. See Azzouka, 777 F.2d at 75.
129. See REAL ID Act, supra note 49.
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court's determination suggests that if a person suspected of posing
a threat to national security is going to be excluded from refugee
status whether he qualifies or not, there is no meaningful reason to
allow the adjudication of the asylum claim to proceed. The oppos-
ing argument to this is, of course, that exclusionary evaluation is
part of the refugee status determination process. One might argue,
then, that the national security concerns should just be part of the
ordinary exclusion evaluation. In the Azzouka case, however, the
court identified a group of people who would not be granted asy-
lum regardless of the fact that they might technically qualify. °
Although there are other notable cases that were adjudicated
mainly on security grounds like Azzouka,13 1 most cases pertaining to
national security also involve at least one of the other statutory
bars, mainly the terrorism bar. This is particularly true after the
elaboration of the terrorism bar under the IIRIRA and UPA. De-
tailed discussion of the terrorism bar follows.
5. Terrorism
Terrorism is likely the most significant and most controversial
statutory bar to asylum currently. Although the Refugee Conven-
tion does not explicitly contain a terrorism bar, it does exclude
persons from refugee status "[for] whom there are reasonable
grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the country."
132
The original INA provision pertaining to terrorism, modified by
the PATRIOT Act133 and the REAL ID Act 34 has only recently
gained significant jurisprudential import. Since scholarly commen-
taries about the subject are surprisingly sparse, 5 it is important to
lay out the statutory scheme in some detail.
Section 208(b) (2) (A) (v) provides that an alien is excluded from
receiving asylum if the alien is specifically described elsewhere in
the statute, or if the Attorney General determines that there are
130. Azzouka, 777 F.2d at 75-76.
131. See, e.g., Avila v. Rivkind, 724 F. Supp. 945 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (involving a prominent
Cuban anti-Castro leader).
132. See Refugee Convention, supra note 57, at art. 33(2).
133. See PATRIOT Act, supra note 43, at § 411(b) (2).
134. REAL ID Act, supra note 49, at § 101(b).
135. For example, the 2007 edition of one of the leading textbooks on refugee law
dedicates only a few pages for this subject. See KAREN MUSALO,JENNIFER MooRE & RICHARD
A. BOSWELL, REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 888-95 (3d ed. 2007). The other leading textbook
also devotes a few pages for this subject. See ANKER, LAw OF ASYLUM, supra note 55, at 442-
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reasonable grounds for regarding the alien as a danger to the se-
curity of the United States.
1 3 6
Section 212 (a) (3) (B) (i) of the INA provides a general exclu-
sionary rule pertaining to terrorism. 3 7 Adjudication of cases
involving these provisions could be extraordinarily difficult for rea-
sons described in the following subsections in some detail.
a. Material Support
Because the definition of important terms are so broad, critics
insist that some genuine refugees, particularly those who were en-
gaged in fights against gross human rights abuses, could be
inappropriately denied refugee status on the basis that their ac-
tions fall within the scope of "engaging in terrorist activities.",3 8 For
example, a broad application of the material support provision of
the INA could arguably exclude Iraqis who aligned with U.S. sol-
diers in the fight against Saddam Hussein. 3 9 U.S. sympathizers such
as Mohammed Odeh Al Refaiel, who was granted U.S. asylum in
2003 after helping rescue Jessica Lynch from a hospital in Nassiri-
yah, would be excluded on the basis of providing material support
to U.S. soldiers. In fact, the Georgetown Law Center Human Rights
Institute reported that the Department of Homeland Security dis-
closed during oral argument before the BIA that Al Refaiel would
be excluded from asylum as having provided material support in
furtherance of a terrorist activity as the term is defined under the
INA.1
40
Under the INA section 212(a) (3) (B) (iv), the term " [e]ngag[ing]
in terrorist activity" is defined broadly to include not only directly
committing "terrorist activity" and providing material support to
others engaged in terrorism,' but also preparation to commit such
activity and soliciting funds and members14 2 for terrorist causes.
136. See8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2) (A) (v) (2000 & Supp. 2007).
137. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (3) (B) (2000 & Supp. 2007).
138. See, e.g., Michele L. Lombardo, AnnigjieJ. Buwalda & Patricia Bast Lyman, Terror-
ism, Material Support, the Inherent Right to Self-Defense, and the U.S. Obligation to Protect Legitimate
Asylum Seekers in a Post-9/11, Post-PATRIOT Act, Post-REAL ID Act world, 4 REGENT J. INT'L L.
237, 258-59 (2006); see also, Georgetown University Law Center Human Rights Institute,
Unintended Consequences: Refugee Victims of the War on Terror (2006), reprinted in REFUGEE LAW
AND POLICY, supra note 135, at 888-95.
139. See generally id.
140. See Georgetown Law Center Human Rights Institute, supra note 138, at 893, n. 84
(citing Transcript of Oral Argument at 24-35, In re Ma San Kywe, U.S. Department ofJustice,
Executive Office for Immigration Review, United States Immigration Court (Jan. 26, 2006)).
141. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (3) (B) (iv) (VI) (2000 & Supp. 2007).
142. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (3) (B) (iv) (I)-(II).
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Because the definition encompasses so many activities, adjudicators
face significant complexities in applying this definition in practice,
such as in the Al Refaiel case.
Congress classified some ambiguities contained in the defini-
tion1 4 3 under the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention
Act of 2004, but some ambiguities still remain. 
4
INA 212(a) (3) (B) (iii) provides in part that:
[t]he term 'terrorist activity' means any activity which is
unlawful under the laws of the place where it is committed...
and which involves any of the following:4  ... [t]he use of any
... explosive, firearm, or other weapon or dangerous device
(other than for mere personal monetary gain), with intent to
endanger, directly or indirectly, the safety of one or more in-
dividuals or to cause substantial damage to property.4
6
The statute makes no exceptions relating to the purpose of us-
ing dangerous weapons. A different subsection of the same statute
provides that engaging in terrorist activity would mean, inter alia,
gathering "information on potential targets for terrorist activity"'
47
as well as committing acts "that the actor knows, or reasonably
should know, affords material support, including a safe house,
transportation, communication ... ,,148 Read together, these provi-
sions inevitably produce the absurd result noted in the Al Refaiel
example simply because the U.S. soldiers carried weapons and
conducted operations against the law of the place where they con-
ducted the operations, namely Saddam Hussein's laws. They also
arguably endangered the safety of one or more people, at least
Saddam's men, at least indirectly. Finally, Mr. Refaiel provided
them material support at least in the form of gathering informa-
tion or providing communication.
Alarmingly, these types of cases are adjudicated on a regular ba-
sis. Cheema v. Ashcrofi?49 is a case that involved twenty-six different
appearances before an immigration judge and took more than
143. The ambiguity was noted in Humanitarian Law Project v. Ashcroft, 309 F. Supp. 2d
1185, 1200 (C.D. Cal. 2004).
144. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458,
§ 6603(b)-(c) (2), 118 Stat. 3638, 3762-63 (2004).
145. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii) (2000 & Supp. 2007).
146. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii)(V)(b).
147. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (3) (B) (iv) (l1).
148. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI).
149. Cheema v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 848 (9th Cir. 2004).
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eleven years to resolve. 5 ' Petitioners were initially denied refugee
status because they had raised money for people engaged in terror-
ist activity. The Indian couple sought asylum in the United States
because they had experienced persecution in their home country
and felt the likelihood of future persecution was strong because of
Mr. Cheema's involvement with a political movement.J The cen-
tral issue in this case related to the nature of the movement and
the level of Cheema and his wife Kaur's involvement.
Mr. Cheema had helped the All India Sikh Student Federation
organize a protest rally against the Indian government's decision to
divert water from the Punjab province. 5 2 He gave food and shelter
to two leaders of the group 53 after his arrival in the United States.
54
The money was used for various purposes including for the provi-
sion of legal representation to Sikh Federation members detained
in the United States."55 The movement eventually split into peaceful
and militant factions,' 56 the latter led by Daljit Singh Bittu ("SSB"),
whom Cheema had known in college. 15 7 Although Cheema denied
any involvement in or advocacy for the militant activities, he did
keep in distant touch with SSB. He testified that he attempted to
advise SSB against militant actions.'5 8 SSB later became one of In-
dia's wanted persons for his involvement in a bank robbery and
150. The case was first instituted in May 1993. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit handed down its decision in this case in August, 2004. Even then it affirmed in part,
reversed in part and remanded it for further proceedings. Id. at 851. Although Cheema was
decided under prior law, it offers an excellent demonstration of existing challenges. Under
the current law, the Ninth Circuit arrived at a slightly different conclusion by distinguishing
Cheema. See, e.g., Bellout v. Ashcroft, 363 E3d 975 (9th Cir. 2004).
151. According to his testimony that the immigration judge found consistent and
credible, Cheema suffered severe past persecution including several arrests, and tortures
that resulted in hospitalization. Id. at 850-52. The Appeals Court's description of one in-
stance reads: "When he was unable to say, he was taken into the jail yard, stripped, bound,
stretched repeatedly on a pulley, and finally subjected to a solid steel roller being rolled over
his thighs, breaking the muscles and causing him to lose consciousness." Id. at 851. A de-
scription of another incident reads:
In May or June of 1989, Cheema was again arrested and taken to Amritsar for inter-
rogation. He was beaten and his right leg broken by his police interrogators. He was
brought before a magistrate, who ordered him taken to a hospital where his broken
leg was set, but on remand to police custody the police broke it again.
Id.
152. Id. at 850.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 852.
155. Id.
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assassination.'5 " When Cheema found out about SSB's deplorable
actions, he urged him to cease such activities. Cheema's urging
eventually resulted in the release of a kidnapping victim.1
Cheema's wife, Kaur, on her part also admitted to having raised
money for Sikh widows but denied sending money for any militant
activities.'
The immigration judge who first adjudicated the Cheemas' asy-
lum claims found both Cheema and his wife, Kaur, to be credible
witnesses.6 2 She then granted Cheema's wife asylum but wavered
on Cheema's petition. First, she denied his claim based on his "lack
of candor."' Then, she granted him the relief of withholding of
removal. Finally, she decided that he was barred from that relief
because he was "engaged in terrorist activity.' 6 4 In an interesting
twist, the judge found that the bar was subject to discretionary
waiver under INA 243(h) (3) as amended by the AEDPA and grated
the waiver.
65
Both the claimants and the government appealed the decision.
The BIA began its inquiry by noting the complexity of the matter
and upheld the immigration court's credibility determination. 66
The immigration court specifically held that Cheema endured bru-
tal torture in India and is "one of the few prominent pro-Khalistan
leaders in the world who would be in danger if returned to In-
dia.' 67 The BIA, however, held that both Cheema and his wife were
barred from asylum and withholding of removal because they "had
engaged in terrorist activity" within the meaning of the INA by
providing material support by soliciting money for individuals and
groups including SSB and others, likely knowing that these people
were engaged in terrorism. The respondents appealed to the
Ninth Circuit. More than eleven years after they first sought asy-
lum, the Ninth Circuit handed down a decision demonstrating the
complex doctrinal dilemma surrounding the entire issue of terror-
ism and asylum in the contemporary world. The court's decision
also offers perhaps one of the best articulations of the law
159. Id.
160. Id. at 851.
161. Id. at 852.
162. Id. Although a classified evidence was also introduced into the record in this case,
the court found it less than helpful. The most important evidence remained to be the testi-
mony of the asylum seekers. As such, the finding of credibility was an important aspect of
the evidentiary inquiry.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 852-53.
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pertaining to the terrorism exception to asylum. It is discussed in
some detail below.
As the asylum claim in this case was filed before the enactment
of the IIRIRA,'69 it was adjudicated under the provisions of AEDPA
pertaining to the terrorism exception. 1 0 The IIRIRA and subse-
quent amendments did not substantially alter the basic premise of
the terrorism exception.
The court analyzed former INA section 208, as amended by
AEDPA section 241.17' This provision, dealing specifically with de-
nial of asylum to terrorists, states that, "The Attorney General may
not grant an alien asylum if the Attorney General determines that
the alien is excludable under subclause (I), (II), or (III) of section
212(a) (3) (B) (i) or deportable under section 241 (a) (4) (B), unless
the Attorney General, in the discretion of the Attorney General,
determines that there are not reasonable grounds for regarding
the alien as a danger to the security of the United States."
172
From the outset, the Ninth Circuit endorsed the BIA's view that
a determination of participation in terrorist activities does not
automatically make the applicant a danger to the security of the
United States.'73 More importantly, it expressly affirmed the BIA's
view that "a separate determination with respect to the alien's dan-
ger to national security" must be made. 174 As will be discussed later,
this determination is exceedingly important for the whole juris-
prudence of terrorism and refugee statutes because the link
between exclusion and national security lends credence and ra-
tionality to an exception that would otherwise seem dubious. It is
important to note here that the BIA's approach in Cheema regard-
ing the requirement of an independent determination of the
threat to national security significantly departs from its determina-
tion with respect to the "particularly serious crime" bar discussed
under Section II(B) (2) above.
The BIA's position on the issue of whether a person who has
been proven to have committed "a particularly serious crime" must
also be independently determined to pose a national security
threat. This is articulated in the Matter of Q-T-M-T 75 In this case,
169. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 8 U.S.C.).
170. See Cheema, 383 F.3d at 855.
171. Id.
172. See Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 208, 66
Stat. 163, § 208 (1952).
173. See Cheema, 383 F.3d at 855.
174. Id.
175. See In re Q-T-M-T, 21, 1. & N. Dec. 639 (B.IA. 1996).
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the BIA clearly held that an independent determination of
whether the claimant is also a danger to the community is unnec-
essary as long as he is proven to have committed a particularly
serious crime. 76 As indicated above, the Courts of Appeals have
almost invariably affirmed this determination. 7
The distinction that the BIA makes between the two types of
bars seems to be predicated on the underlying assumptions behind
them. Persons who have committed "a particularly serious crime"
are not only considered dangerous per se but also undeserving of
protection. Moreover, as discussed in section II(B) (2) above, the
clear and convincing evidentiary requirement is so high here that
it leaves little room for doubt as to the guilt or innocence of the
individual subjected to the bar. Since the standard of proof for the
exclusion of an alien on terrorism grounds is complicated at best,
the risk of error is significantly high.
In Cheema, the Ninth Circuit stated that automatically finding an
alien who might be considered to have engaged in terrorism to be
a definite security threat within the meaning of the statute "would
render the exception to the asylum bar meaningless."'"" The court
further stated that, "The statutory scheme contemplates an alien
who is potentially excludable under one of the designated provi-
sions, yet remains eligible for withholding of deportation or asylum
upon a determination that 'there are not reasonable grounds for
regarding the alien to be a danger to the security of the United
States."17'
The court continued, articulating a two-part test which must be
met cumulatively: "(1) whether an alien engaged in a terrorist ac-
tivity, and (2) whether there are not reasonable grounds to believe
that the alien is a danger to the security of the United States."'80
This test is loosely discerned from the following statutory scheme
analyzed by the court: (1) sets forth the criteria for eligibility for asy-
lum; (2) lists several grounds of exclusion despite the fulfillment of
the eligibility criteria; (3) provides for discretionary waiver of some
grounds of exclusion. In the context of the terrorism exception, the
waiver provision applies to one prong of the two-pronged test
176. Id. at 655-56; see also Matter of C-, 20 1. & N. Dec. 529 (B.I.A. 1992); Matter of
U-M-, 20 1. & N. Dec. 327 (B.I.A. 1991).
177. See Garcia v. I.N.S., 7 F.3d 1320 (7th Cir. 1993); Kofa v. I.N.S., 60 F.3d 1084 (4th Cir.
1995); AI-Salehi v. I.N.S., 47 F.3d 390 (10th Cir. 1995); Martin v. I.N.S., 972 F.2d 657 (5th Cir.
1992).
178. See Cheema, 383 F.3d at 855.
179. Id. (citing Nevada v. Watkins, 939 F.2d 710, 715 (9th Cir. 1991) ("[w]e should avoid
an interpretation of a statute that renders any part of it superfluous and does not give effect
to all of the words used by Congress." (citations omitted)).
180. Cheema, 383 F.3d at 855-56.
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discussed above. The twist, however, is that aliens who have en-
gaged in terrorist activities are considered to be threats to national
security per se unless the Attorney General grants a discretionary
waiver of those security grounds. Once the issue of "engaging in
terrorist activity" has been affirmatively determined, the issue of
whether the alien is also deemed to be a national security threat is
in reality part of the discretionary waiver inquiry rather than the
determination of exclusionary grounds in general. Although it is
very important to note this distinction, the practical consequences
of the statutory twist are minimal because the exercise of discretion
may not be "arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law. 1 81 In other
words, it must be granted where the statutory requirements are
met, barring extraordinary circumstances. Hence, the second part
of the two-part test is in fact a part of the waiver inquiry.8 2 Former
INA section 243(h) (2) (D) provided that an alien who is consid-
ered to have engaged in terrorist activity is considered a danger to
the national security of the United States. But again, the same pro-
vision allows for a discretionary waiver. Therefore, the two-part test
would be whether the alien was engaged in terrorist activity and, if
he was, whether he deserves a discretionary waiver of this ground
of exclusion because his activities had nothing to do with the secu-
rity of the United States.'"3 According to the BIA, an alien is
deemed to represent a danger to the national security of the
United States where the alien acts "'in a way which 1) endangers
181. See id. at 859 (citing Lopez-Galarza v. I.N.S., 99 F.3d 954, 960 (9th Cir. 1996)); see
also Mejia-Carrillo '. I.N.S., 656 F.2d 520, 522 (9th Cir. 1991); Babai v. I.N.S., 985 F.2d 252,
255 (6th Cir. 1993).
182. The court's opinion with respect to the source of the two-prong test is not readily
discernable. Perhaps the best articulation is contained in the following paragraph:
Under the INA, aliens are rendered ineligible for withholding of deportation if
"there are reasonable grounds for regarding them as a danger to the security of the
United States." Aliens who have engaged in terrorist activity are considered a danger
to the security of the United States subject to a discretionary waiver. We review
whether substantial evidence supports both the finding of terrorist activity and the
determination that the alien is a danger to the security of the United States.
Cheema, 383 F.3d at 856 (citations omitted).
183. The discretionary waiver provision is extremely valuable. Given the broad defini-
tion of terrorist activities to include almost any kind of material support to any kind of
movement, its application could result in some serious anomalies without the waiver provi-
sion. The statutory scheme pertaining to the relief of withholding of deportation under the
Convention Against Torture demonstrates the importance of the discretionary waiver provi-
sion. As the Ninth Circuit noted in Cheema, under former INA § 241 (B) (3) (B) of INA 8
C.F.R. § 208.16(s) (2), an alien is excluded from protection under CAT if the alien is consid-
ered a danger to national security. A mandatory rule provides that for purposes of this
provision an alien who had engaged in terrorist activity is considered to be a national secu-
rity threat per se. See id.
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the lives, property, or welfare of United States citizens; 2) com-
promises the national defense of the United States; or 3) materially
damages the foreign relations or economic interests of the United
States.'"""
Applying this three-part test, the BIA held that Cheema and his
wife posed a security threat because their joint solicitation of funds
for the Sikh resistance organization was considered an engagement
in terrorist activity. The BIA said, [i]t is clear that those who en-
gage in terrorism within the United States, even when that
terrorism is not directly aimed at the United States, necessarily en-
danger the lives, property, and welfare of United States citizens and
compromises our national defense"18 5 because such acts inherently
involve the United States in foreign conflicts without its consent
and "create the very real possibility that such conflicts will be
brought home to use by their warring factions.'
8 6
Having duly noted the highly deferential standard of review for
factual determinations, the Ninth Circuit categorically rejected the
BLA's determination that Cheema's wife, Kaur, engaged in terror-
ism 1 1 since her testimony that, on two occasions, she had sent
money to widowed women and orphaned children' 8 was found by
the court not to evidence any link between the money she sent and
militant activities. 85 The court stated that "the Board's conclusion
that [Kaur's] donations to Indian widows and orphaned children
'obviously' and 'inherently' posed a danger to the security of the
United States stretches speculation to its breaking point."' 90 As a
result, it was unnecessary to inquire whether Kaur was also a secu-
rity threat. With respect to Cheema as well, although the court did
not feel compelled to question the negative inference drawn from
Cheema's fundraising activities,'9' it was not convinced that there
was substantial evidence to support the determination that he
posed a security threat. 92 According to the court, the BIA
184. Id. (accepting the Board's interpretation of "national security").
185. Id. at 857.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 856.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. The court added: "The Board adopted the immigration judge's findings of fact.
The immigration judge made no finding that these widows or orphans were engaged in
terrorism, had committed or were planning to commit terrorist acts, or were conduits to
terrorist organizations. The Board is bound by this absence of factual foundation as it is
bound by the IJ's and its own acceptance of the credibility of Rajwinder Kaur. Not a scrap of
evidence shows her to have engaged in terrorist activity as defined in INA, Sec.
212(a) (3) (B) (iii)." Id. at 856-57.
191. Id. at 857.
192. Id.
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inappropriately merged the two-part test into one when it held
that, "[i]t is clear that those who engage in terrorism within the
United States, even when that terrorism is not directly aimed at the
United States, necessarily endanger the lives, property, and welfare
of the United States citizens and compromises our national de-
fense." 193 Contrary to the government's assertion, however, it is by
no means self-evident that a person engaged in extra-territorial or
resistance activities-even militant activities-is necessarily a threat
to the security of the United States. One country's terrorist can of-
ten be another country's freedom-fighter.
194
193. Id.
194. Id. at 858. The court offered elaborate examples, one of which follows:
That terrorist activity affecting a country struggling with strife cannot be equated
automatically with an impact on the security of the United States is dramatically illus-
trated by the case of Nelson Mandela. In 1961, Mandela organized a paramilitary
branch of the African National Congress, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) or "Spear of the
Nation," to conduct guerrilla warfare against the ruling white government. He then
went into hiding to carry out the MK's mission: "to make government impossible,"
and began arranging for key leaders and their volunteers to go abroad for training in
guerrilla warfare. Mandela was convicted by the South African government of treason
in 1964 and sentenced to life in prison. In 1986, Congress passed the Comprehensive
Anti-Apartheid Act, stating that its goal was to pressure the South African government
to release Nelson Mandela from prison. It would not be sensible to conclude that
Congress, in aiding a man convicted of treason by his own government, endangered
the security of the United States or that the alien supporters of Mandela in this coun-
try were all deportable as terrorists endangering our national security.
383 F.3d at 858-59 (citations omitted); see also ANTHONY SAMPSON, MANDELA: THE AUTHOR-
IZED BIOGRAPHY 150-51, 158, 177 (1999).
The court's opinion contained more examples, some of which are reproduced below:
The Contras in Nicaragua, for instance, used terrorist tactics in an attempt to over-
throw the ruling Sandinista government. It would be difficult to conclude, however,
without specific evidence, that supporters of the Contras within the United States
compromised national defense. The United States itself opposed the Sandinista re-
gime and sent money to assist the Contras. Similarly, the Solidarity Movement that
was instrumental in ending Communism in Eastern Europe was labeled by the Soviet
Union as subversive and dangerous, but it can hardly be said that contributors to the
Solidarity Movement posed a threat to the lives and property in the United States. We
cannot conclude automatically that those individuals who are activists for an inde-
pendent Tibet are necessarily threats to the United States because they have been
labeled by China as insurgents. Without further evidence, it does not follow that an
organization that might be a danger to one nation is necessarily a danger to the secu-
rity of the United States.
History, indeed, is to the contrary. At least since 1848, the year of democratic revo-
lutions in Europe, the United States has been a hotbed of sympathy for revolution in
other lands, often with emigres to this country organizing moral and material sup-
port for their countrymen oppressed by European empires such as those of Austria,
Britain and Russia. In the twentieth century, active revolutionaries such as De Valera
and Ben Gurion worked in the United States for the liberation of their homelands.
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The doctrinal debate surrounding this issue is featured in Judge
Johnnie C. Rawlinson's dissenting opinion to this case. He takes
the position that a chain of events occurring anywhere in the world
cannot be ignored. '" Noting that on June 28, 1914, the assassina-
tion in Sarajevo of Archduke Franz Ferdinand set off a chain of
events that within a few months embroiled all Europe in World
War I, Judge Rawlinson concludes that a determination that aliens
engaged in terrorist activities anywhere necessarily supports the
conclusion that they pose a security threat to the United States and
that no separate proof of such threat is necessary after that deter-
mination is made., 6 In conclusion, he remarked, "Contrary to the
majority's apparent view, our country should not become a haven
for those who desire to foment international strife from our
shores."
197
To this day, the doctrinal debate continues to be whether aliens
deemed to have engaged in acts of terrorism as statutorily defined
may be exempted from exclusion if they do not pose a security
threat specifically to the United States. This doctrinal dilemma
seems to have essentially resulted in the complication of the tech-
nical details of the law governing the terrorism bar to asylum.
To add to the complexity further, on top of the category of
aliens who are excluded because they had personally been engaged
in terrorist activities or provided material support as in the
Cheema case, the statute creates different layers of involvement
and participation that would exclude asylum-seekers on terrorism
grounds. Some examples are discussed below in the following sub-
section.
b. Participation
The terrorism bar also excludes: (a) persons who have prepared
to commit a terrorist activity or incited others to commit a terrorist
More recently, foreign anti-Communists living in the United States were active in en-
couraging and aiding movements against Communist tyranny in the Soviet Union
and China. Much of this revolutionary activity would fall under the definition of ter-
rorist activity as the Board interprets the statute. None of it had consequences for the
lives and property of American citizens or the national defense, and the slight strains
occasionally put on our foreign relations were more than offset by the reputation
earned by the United States as a continuing cradle for liberty in other parts of the
world.
Cheema, 383 F.3d at 858.
195. Id. at 860.
196. Id. at 860.
197. Id. at 861.
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activity; 18 (b) representatives or members of terrorist organiza-
tions;" (c) persons who have solicited funds or members for the
benefit of a terrorist organization); (d) persons who endorse or
espouse terrorist activity or persuade others to do so; (e) those who
have received military training from a terrorist organization or on
behalf of one; and (f) spouse and children of the above catego-
ns200riesY
°
The difficulty of adjudicating cases involving allegations of direct
involvement with terrorist activity as in the Cheema case has been
demonstrated under material support in subsection 1 above.
i. Preparation and Incitement
Preparation
Preparing or planning a terrorist activity is considered a ground
for exclusion.01 In criminal law, preparation to commit a crime is
not ordinarily punishable since no tangible harm typically results
from mere preparation. Preparation to commit a terrorist activity
is, in fact, punishable. Like driving while intoxicated, punishment
of this offense is a preventative measure, yet it is often difficult to
prove with limited and/or ambiguous evidence. Gathering evi-
dence for events that may have occurred a long time ago or in a
foreign country can be challenging. Further, the definitions of the
statuses or acts which can qualify a person for engagement in ter-
rorist activity are ambiguous. Albin Eser, a former judge for the
International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia ("ICTY"), says that
the very essence of crime is harm2  and leading criminal law
scholar Professor Dressler claims that "the criminal law punishes
conduct and not mere thoughts." 20 3 It punishes people for the
198. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1952 §212(a)(3)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(i) (2000 & Supp. 2007).
199. §1182(a)(3)(B)(vi).
200. See § 1182(a) (3) (B) (i). It is important to note that a threat, attempt or conspiracy
to commit any one of these acts is also considered a terrorist activity. See
§ 1182(a) (3) (B) (iii)(VI). Obviously, the existence of such inchoate offenses would compli-
cate the adjudication of cases even more. In the interest of brevity, this article does not go
into the details of the adjudicatory challenges involved in cases charging the commission of
inchoate offense for purposes of exclusion.
201. See§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(II).
202. Albin Eser, The Principle of "Harm" in the Concept of Crime: A Comparative Analysis of
the Criminally Protected Legal Interest, 4 DUQ. L. REv. 345, 345, 413 (1965).
203. JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 127 (West, 4th ed.
2007).
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harm that results from their voluntary acts or omissions. 4 In the
absence of a cognizable social harm, it is difficult to prove the actus
reus and thus the crime. Still, Professor Dressler notes that driving
while intoxicated is punishable even when it does not result in any
harm as it is merely a preventive measure.2 5 The preparation ex-
ception to asylum seems to fall under this latter rubric.
Incitement
The INA's definition of engaging in terrorist activity includes in-
citement to commit a terrorist activity,20 6 which is even more
problematic than preparation or planning because it involves free
speech issues. For example, does selling a newspaper affiliated with
a terrorist organization for personal gain amount to incitement to
terrorism?
The Sixth Circuit raised this issue in Daneshvar v. Ashcroft,2 0 a
case in which the immigration court and the BIA excluded the re-
spondent on terrorism grounds because about fifteen years ago,
when he was sixteen years old, he sold newspapers affiliated with
an organization, which was later designated as a terrorist organiza-
tion.20  Although the incitement issue was not outcome
determinative in this case, the Sixth Circuit made an interesting
remark in a footnote relating to incitement 0 9 stating in pertinent
part that:
We merely note a certain degree of ambiguity in the statute
that the parties may wish to consider on remand. A "terrorist
activity" is defined as an activity that would be unlawful, inter
alia, in the United States if it had been committed in the
United States and that involves, inter alia, taking hostages.
The term "engaging in terrorist activity" is defined, inter alia,
as incitement. It is therefore unclear whether or not an act
that would qualify as "engage in terrorist activity" must at the
same time be unlawful in the United States. °
In particular, the court said that it is unclear whether an
incitement conduct must be evaluated "in light of the more
204. Id. at 126-127, 145.
205. Id. at 145.
206. See§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(I).
207. Daneshvar v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 615 (6th Cir. 2004).
208. Id. at 620-21.
209. Id. at 627-28 n.13.
210. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (3)(B)(iii), (B) (iv) (I)).
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speech-friendly First Amendment standard articulated by the Su-
preme Court in Brandenburg v. Ohio."
2 11
The challenges of the substantive free speech standards aside,
excluding an asylum-seeker on incitement grounds would inevita-
bly involve serious interpretive and evidentiary issues. The statute
requires immigration judges to resolve these issues just like any
other issue involved in removal proceedings.
ii. Representative of a Terrorist Organization
INA Section 212(a) (3) (B) (i) (lV) expressly excludes an alien
who is a representative of "a terrorist organization"2 1 2 or "a political,
social, or other group that endorses or espouses terrorist activity.
The first category is a simple per se rule. The State Department
designates foreign terrorist organizations as terrorist organizations
under section 219 of the INA and keeps a list of these organiza-
tions.1 4 Three general rules govern the designation process:1 5 (1)
the organization must be a foreign organization;216 (2) it must en-
gage in terrorist activity21 7 or "retain [] the capability and intent to
engage in terrorist activity or terrorism" ;2' s and (3) such activity or
intent must threaten the security of the United States and its na-
tionals.219
What is important for purposes of this Article is the use of this
designation as conclusive evidence of any organization's status as a
211. Id. (citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (standing for the proposition
that government may not punish inflammatory speech unless it is likely to incite imminent
lawless action)).
212. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (3) (B) (i) (IV) (aa). Terrorist organization is defined under 8
U.S.C. § 1182(a) (3) (B) (vi).
213. See§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(IV)(bb).
214. See generally § 1189.
215. This approach was introduced for the very first time in 1996 through the adoption
of the AEDPA, and IIRIRA. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132 § 302, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996); see also Illegal Immigration Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, §671(c), 110 Stat.
3009 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
216. See8U.S.C.§1189(a)(1)(A).
217. See § 1189(a)(1)(B). "Engage in terrorist activity" is defined under
§ 1182(a) (3) (B) (iv). § 1189(a) (1) (B) also cross references to "terrorism" as defined in
§ 140(d) (2) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, Pub. L.
No. 100-204, 101 Stat. 1331 (1987).
218. See § 1189(a)(1)(B). This subsection was also amended by the Uniting and
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct
Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, §411 (c) (1), 115 Stat. 272,
348 (2001).
219. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(A) (1) (C) (emphasis added). This subsection was also amended by
the USA PATRIOT Act. SeePub. L. No. 107-56, § 422(c) (3), 115 Stat. 272, 348 (2001).
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"terrorist organization" within the meaning of INA, section
212(a) (3) (B) (vi). Section 219(a) (8) states that, "If a designation
under this subsection has become effective under paragraph
(2) (B) a defendant in a criminal action or an alien in a removal
proceeding shall not be permitted to raise any question concern-
ing the validity of the issuance of such designation as a defense or
an objection at any trial or hearing. 220 Thus, if a person is a repre-
sentative of any organization designated as a terrorist organization
through this process, he is automatically barred from asylum.
Whenever an asylum-seeker is alleged to have affiliation with a des-
ignated terrorist organization, the answer to whether the said
organization is a terrorist organization is as easy as flipping another
page because the list is published in the Federal Registry.22' The
challenge remains, however, whether the asylum-seeker is a repre-
sentative of such organization as that term is defined in the
statute.2 The term "representative" includes "an officer, official, or
spokesman of an organization, and any person who directs, coun-
sels, commands, or induces an organization or its members to
engage in terrorist activity.
"
,2
The determination of whether a person has directed, counseled,
commanded or induced an organization to commit acts of terror-
ism could be very difficult because in most cases reliable evidence
could not be presented. Typically, courts only have the asylum-
seeker's testimony, the Department of State Country Condition
Report and perhaps some other causal reports. This challenge is
compounded when the organization is not even designated as such
but is simply "a political, social, or other group that endorses or
espouses terrorist activity."2 24 Evidently, this is a very broad category
that would certainty invite serious controversy. Immigration judges
routinely determine whether they think a certain foreign organiza-
tion endorses and espouses terrorism based on evidence submitted
to them which is usually limited to the claimant's testimony and a
few general reports.
The term "representative" functions as a catch-all in the INA
definitions. Although usually membership alone in a terrorist or-
ganization is enough to evidence a person's significant tie to the
organization, if a member is lucky enough to be granted a waiver
220. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a) (8).
221. The current list of designated organizations is available at http://www.state.gov/s/
ct/rls/fs/37191.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2007).
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of exclusion, that person can still be qualified as a representative, a
status for which no waiver is permissible.2 5
iii. Mere Membership in a Terrorist Organization
Even membership in an organization that is believed to have
provided support to terrorists would be enough to exclude an asy-
lum-seeker from protection. Although the INA itself does not
define "membership," the Department of State has issued guide-
lines that incorporate the following factors: acknowledgement or
recognition by the organization or other members, active partici-
pation in or leadership of the organization, receiving benefits from
it, contributing money to it, taking part in the organization's activi-
ties, and frequent association with other members of the
organization.2 2 6 An asylum-seeker who could demonstrate by clear
and convincing evidence that he "did not know, and should not
reasonably have known, that the organization was a terrorist or-
ganization" may avoid exclusion.27 It is important to note that this
exception does not apply to a terrorist organization designated
under INA Section 219 because publication of these organizations'
names is considered sufficient public notice.
The following example demonstrates the breadth of this defini-
tion. Group A has four members, W, X, Y, and Z, all from Burma 8
225. § 1182(d)(3)(B)(i) ("The Secretary of State, after consultation with the Attorney
General and the Secretary of Homeland Security, or the Secretary of Homeland Security,
after consultation with the Secretary of State and the Attorney General, may conclude in
such Secretary's sole unreviewable discretion that subsection (a)(3) (B)(i) (IV)(bb) or
(a) (3) (B) (i) (VII) of this section shall not apply to an alien, that subsection
(a) (3) (B) (iv) (VI) of this section shall not apply with respect to any material support an alien
afforded to an organization or individual that has engaged in a terrorist activity, or that
subsection (a) (3) (B) (vi) (III) of this section shall not apply to a group solely by virtue of
having a subgroup within the scope of that subsection. The Secretary of State may not, how-
ever, exercise discretion under this clause with respect to an alien once removal proceedings
against the alien are instituted under section 1229a of this title.").
226. See U.S. Dep't of State, Cable No. 97-State-191813 (Oct. 9, 1997), reprinted in 75 IN-
TERPRETER RELEASES 295, 296-97 (Mar. 2, 1998) [hereinafter Cable].
227. See§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(VI).
228. The hypothetical discussed here is based on real asylum cases involving asylum-
seekers from Burma with some modifications for purposes of demonstration. For a descrip-
tion of these cases, see HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, ABANDONING THE PERSECUTED: VICTIMS OF
TERRORISM AND OPPRESSION BARRED FROM ASYLUM, 13 (2006), http://www.humanightsfirst.
info/pdf/O6925-asy-abandon-persecuted.pdf (last visited Nov. 7, 2007). In one of the cases re-
ported by Human Rights First, an immigration judge denied asylum to a Burmese asylum-
seeker on terrorism grounds because the asylum-seeker, a teacher by profession, testified
that he was visited by members of the Burmese Chin National Front ("CNF"), a group impli-
cated for using terrorist tactics against the Burmese dictatorship. He also said that CNF
members spoke with him about democracy and stayed in his village sharing shelter and
food. He indicated that he did not provide hospitality willingly. The Burmese government
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and currently residing in the United States. They raise funds to as-
sist Group B, an affiliated humanitarian organization which
provides humanitarian assistance to widows and orphans of mem-
bers of Group C. Group C wages a military struggle against the
Burmese military regime. W, X, Y, and Z admit that they knew the
widows fed members of Group C whenever the members visited
their villages. Members of Group A continue to send them money
despite knowledge of this involvement.
Under the statutory scheme, all members of Group A could be
independently excluded from protection because of this periph-
eral connection to terrorist activity. Due to the State Department's
guidelines, any of them could also be excluded because they fre-
quently associated with those who contributed to the terrorist
organization. 9
Members of Group A would have to prove by clear and convinc-
ing evidence that there was no way that they "should have known"
about the terrorist activities of the organization. For example, a
newspaper article reporting that members of Group C were shel-
tered and fed by a certain Burmese village could easily be used to
prove that the members of Group A "should have known" that
their money was being used occasionally to provide support to ter-
rorist groups.
iv. Solicitation of Funds and Members
Actions falling under the solicitation of funds and members for
• 230
a terrorist organization are one step beyond those illustrated in
the Burma example. This classification falls under the same stan-
dard of proof as does membership in a terrorist organization.23' A
person does not have to be a member or be personally affiliated
with an organization to be found to have engaged in solicitation of
funds for a terrorist organization. If this is the case, that person
may obtain protection by proving by clear and convincing evidence
that he did not know or should not reasonably have known that the
group was engaged in terrorist activity. It gets more complex when
a group has legitimate subgroups that may be unknowingly or
retaliated against the villagers for sheltering the CNF fighters by burning the village. The
asylum-seeker was taken by the government and tortured. He finally managed to escape to
the United States. See generally id.
229. See Cable, supra note 226, at 296-97. In fact, the PATRIOT Act's amendment to the
INA made mere association with a terrorist organization an independent ground of inad-
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knowingly assisting terrorists. Therefore, it often turns on the asy-
lum-seeker's knowledge of the terrorist activity and proximity to it.
Solicitation, as an inchoate offense, is very controversial in the
criminal law context, but is even more problematic in the terrorism
context. In criminal law, ordinarily the crime of solicitation is said
to have been committed as soon as "the solicitor asks, entices, or
encourages another to commit the target offense."232 Professor
Dressler says that solicitation is essentially a double inchoate of-
fense because an attempt to conspire to commit a certain crime
could be solicitation to commit the underlying crime.2" In simple
terms, if A attempts to solicit B or conspire with B to kill C, A could
theoretically be charged with attempted solicitation or conspir-
acy.234 Once the underlying offense is attempted or committed,
however, the crime of solicitation may merge and the charge would
just be the commission or attempt of the underlying offense. 5 The
difficulty involved in proving these kinds of dubious crimes is obvi-
ous.
Significantly greater difficulties are involved in adjudicating
cases involving allegations of solicitation of funds and members for
terrorist organization. What if in the hypothetical discussed above,
H unsuccessfully attempted to solicit money for the benefit of
Group A. Would he be treated differently because he did not man-
age to get the money? There seems to be a mens rea requirement
because Congress provided for an exemption if the asylum-seeker
proves that he did not know or should not reasonably have known
that the money would reach terrorists. What if H is arrested before
he had a chance to give the money to Group A? Would he still be
excluded for soliciting funds?
In considering these questions, it is important to note that the
underlying offense in this case is the solicitation itself. Therefore,
one might argue that it is not an inchoate offense at all, although
one may be guilty of solicitation of funds if he asks someone to
raise funds. Regardless of the theoretical implications, proving
state of mind becomes very important. In contrast to criminal cases
where the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
the accused intended to commit the crime of solicitation whatever
232. See DRESSLER, supra note 203, at 804.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Professor Dressier gives the following example, "if Agnes solicits Ben to murder
Camille, and Ben refuses, Agnes is guilty of solicitation; if Ben agrees and kills or attempts to
murder Camille, Agnes is guilty of murder or attempted murder, respectively, under com-
plicity principles . . . ,rather than of the offense of solicitation. If Ben agrees, but is arrested
before the attempt, Agnes and Ben may be prosecuted for conspiracy to commit murder
.... Agnes's solicitation would merge into the conspiracy." Id.
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the underlying offense, under the INA, the burden is on the asy-
lum-seeker to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he did
not know or should not reasonably have known that the funds that
he solicited would benefit a terrorist group or its affiliate.
The government still needs to present a prima facie case that so-
licitation of funds had actually occurred and that those funds had
benefited a terrorist group. The government has to prove each of
the following facts in the following order to establish a prima facie
showing that a person solicited terrorist funds: (1) Group C exists
and is a terrorist organization; (2) Group B exists and it provided
humanitarian assistance to widows and orphans in a certain village
in Burma; (3) The widows and orphans fed and sheltered mem-
bers of Group C;. (4) Group A is a terrorist organization because it
provides material assistance to Group B which, in turn, assists the
widows and orphans who provided the material assistance to
Group C, a known terrorist organization; (5) Finally, it needs to
prove that H intentionally solicited funds for Group A knowing
that the money he passed along would eventually be given to peo-
ple who incidentally provide benefit to the terrorist organization.
Daneshvar v. Ashcrof 3 6 supports the proposition that the prima
facie and state of mind requirements can be inferred from the lan-
guage of the statute. In this case, the court considered the issue of
whether the government needed to present a prima facie case or
prove the state mind of an asylum applicant when the government
sought to exclude him for soliciting members for a terrorist or-
ganization.2 3 7 The petitioner, a thirty-nine-year-old Iranian national,
admitted to having sold newspapers when he was sixteen years old,
the revenue from which supported an organization named Muja-
hedin-e Khalq ("MEK") 28 Since MEK was designated by the State
Department as a terrorist organization, 9 the petitioner was found
to have engaged in the solicitation of members for MEK such that
he should be excluded from asylum.2 4 The BIA affirmed the deci-
sion. The Court of Appeals disagreed and held that, "We would be
hard-pressed to classify any minor who sold newspapers for an or-
ganization that supported an armed revolt against a tyrannical
monarch as a terrorist. To impute such political sophistication to a
teenager that apparently even the U.S. Congress failed to achieve,
236. Daneshvar v. Ashcroft, 355 E3d 615 (2004).
237. Id. at 628.
238. Id. at 619.
239. In fact, because the MEK was not designated as a terrorist organization at the time
the petitioner sold MEK newspapers, he was deemed excludable for soliciting members to
an undesignated clause 212(a) (3) (B) (vi) (III) terrorist organization. Id. at 626.
240. Id. at 621.
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in our minds, would amount to a manifest injustice."24' Moreover,
the court held that to exclude an asylum-seeker from protection
for soliciting members for a terrorist organization under the "knew
or should have known" exception 42 the asylum-seeker's state of
mind when he committed the alleged solicitation must be consid-
ered. 42
Along these same lines falls endorsement or espousement of ter-
rorist activity as well as persuasion of others to endorse such
activity.2" One complication of determining what counts as a ter-
rorist activity is the determination of whether it is sufficient that
the activity would have been illegal in the United States had it been
committed there or whether it is enough that it is illegal in the
country in which it was carried out.245 Given its dependence upon
political opinion, this could potentially have dangerous conse-
quences in the realm of free speech. Unlike some other provisions,
this one does not afford any discretion to government officials to
intervene in the determination of whether a person has engaged in
endorsing or espousing terrorism sufficient to exclude him from
asylum protection. It seems deliberate that the weight of this deci-
sion falls on the judge alone.
Generally, spouses and children of an asylum applicant who falls
under any of these exclusionary criteria are also automatically ex-
cluded from asylum protection.246 However, the exclusion does not
apply to the asylum-seeker's family members if the alleged activity
occurred more than five years prior to filing the asylum applica-
tion.247 One exception applies if the family member did not know
or could not have reasonably known that the accused was engaged
in espousing terrorism.24 Again, immigration judges must grapple
with factual analysis in making this determination. 249 Leniency in
this case stems from a hesitancy to adversely impact free speech.2'5
241. Id. at 628.
242. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(III).
243. Id.
244. See§ 1182(a)(3)(i)(VII).
245. Daneshvar v. Ashcroft, 355 Ed 615, 628 n.13 (2004).
246. See § 1182(a) (3) (B) (i) (IX).
247. Id.
248. § 1182(a) (3) (B) (ii) ("Subclause (VII) of clause (i) does not apply to a spouse or
child-(I) who did not know or should not reasonably have known of the activity causing
the alien to be found inadmissible under this section; or (II) whom the consular officer or
Attorney General has reasonable grounds to believe has renounced the activity causing the
alien to be found inadmissible under this section.").
249. It is important to note, however, that most of the exclusionary grounds may be
waived at the discretion of the Secretary of State in consultation with the Attorney General
and the Department of Homeland Security. See generally § 1182(d)(3) (B).
250. Daneshvar, 355 F.3d at 628 n.13.
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Thankfully for immigration judges, the provision that deals with
military training presents perhaps the clearest statutory language,
but also raises problems when there is no room for judicial discre-
tion in individual cases as the forms that military service can take is
often ambiguous.
III. GOING FORWARD
The preceding examples show that immigration judges are re-
sponsible for adjudicating all asylum claims as well as those
involving terrorism questions. This Article proposes that cases hav-
ing to do with terrorism be assigned to a more specific
authoritative body or person that is specially trained to answer sen-
sitive questions related to terrorism. Congress has already enacted
a law providing for the establishment of a specialized court called
the Alien Terrorist Removal Court ("ATRC").25 The ATRC grew
out of the expansion of the terrorism exception through the
AEDPA and the IIRIRA.2 52 Although this court has not yet been in-
stituted, its very statutory creation indicates a Congressional desire
to deal with terrorism issues separately. At this point in its concep-
tion, the ATRC is not authorized to adjudicate asylum claims. This
Article proposes extension of its mandate.
Under the existing statutory framework, the ATRC would func-
tion under the Supreme Court of the United States" 3 with five
district court judges from different districts selected by the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court.254 The main function of the court
would be to adjudicate removal cases where an alien is suspected of
terrorism and the evidence thereof needs to be kept confidential
for national security reasons. 55 The application must inter alia in-
clude such details as the identity of the particular attorney within
the Attorney General's office who submits the application,"6 the
identity and location of the alien being subjected to the process,57
251. Seegeneraly8 U.s.c. § 1226a (2001).
252. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, §354(a) (5), 110 Stat. 3009 (1996) (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
253. See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1532 (2006).
254. The Chief Justice may assign one or more of the judges who are already on the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of 1978 established under 50 U.S.C. 1803(a). See 8
U.S.C. § 1532(a). The Chief Justice shall also designate one of the five as a chief judge. See
§ 1532 (c)(1). The Chief Judge has the responsibility of promulgating the ATRC's rules and
assign cases to the individual judges. See § 1532(c) (2).
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and a statement of facts establishing "probable cause" that "the
alien is an alien terrorist" and that subjecting him to the ordinary
Title II removal process would pose a national security threat. 5
Finally, the application must be filed with the ATRC under seal "ex




After examining the application and any other evidence submit-
ted by the government, an ARTC judge may grant or deny the
application. 6 If the judge grants the application upon finding
probable cause that the alien is properly identified as an alien ter-
rorist and that the disclosure of the confidential evidence might
pose a national security risk, a removal hearing would commence
under section 504.261 Alternatively, if the judge determines that
there is no probable cause, the government may appeal to the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.2
Unlike ordinary immigration proceedings, aliens in removal
proceedings do have the right to a government appointed attor-
ney263 that is specifically designated by the ATRC and possesses a
security clearance.2 64 Also in these proceedings, the attorneys have
access to confidential evidence and can challenge it in court.2 65 The
hearing is open to the public although confidential evidence may
not be disclosed. 66 The ATRC procedures also provide the alien
with reasonable opportunity to challenge adverse findings on ap-
•267
peal. Presumably, the ATRC only determines if the alien must be
removed because he is a terrorist.21, If the court finds this to be the
case, the alien is taken into custody and removed from the coun-
try.29 While the ATRC does not have jurisdiction to grant relief
from deportation under any of the forms under immigration law,
such as asylum or withholding of removal, an alien may seek legal
status through regular immigration procedures.
The ATRC is already infused with a sound structural foundation,
including reasonable avenues of appeal and due process. At this
point, the court requires only slight modification and jurisdictional
expansion in order to effectively adjudicate terrorism-related
258. See§ 1533(a) (1) (D).
259. See§ 1533(2).
260. See§ 1533(c)(2)-(3).
261. See§ 1533(c) (2).
262. See§ 1533(c)(3); seealso§ 1535(a) (1).
263. See § 1534(c)(1) ("for purposes of determining the maximum amount of compen-
sation, the matter shall be treated as if a felony was charged.").
264. Id.
265. See§ 1534(e)(3)(F).
266. See§ 1534(a) (2).
267. See generally § 1535.
268. See, e.g., § 1534(g).
269. See§ 1534(i).
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claims. Title V of the INA can be easily amended in order to mod-
ify the scope of admissible evidence, add more judges, and grant
immigration relief in the form of asylum or withholding of re-
moval. This would ensure that immigration judges adjudicate all
non-terrorism cases with proper care and without fear of responsi-
bility for allowing a terrorist to remain in the United States.
In addition to installing the ATRC, the substantive law must be
simplified and clarified in order to effectively address the chal-
lenges involved with adjudicating terrorism-related immigration
cases. While it is in the country's best interests to be overly cautious
in granting refugee status to people whose associations might en-
danger national security, there are currently too many gray areas.
After 9/11, Congress chose to err on the side of over-inclusiveness
to the point that some of the provisions do not serve any cogniza-
ble purpose.270 Therefore, the substantive law as it stands today is
"so indefensible [that it] is causing heroes who fought for the
United States to be afraid of being deported. 2 71 According to a
comprehensive report by the U.S. Congressional Commission on
International Religious Freedom, denying refugee status
"[b] ecause [a person] provided inconsequential support to organi-
zations which oppose particularly repressive regimes is not only
undermining the international leadership of the United States in
the field of human rights, it is [also] endangering the lives of inno-
cent refugees who have fled terror or repression."272 The only two
considerations for whether a person should be excluded from asy-
lum protection must be: (1) whether a person is undeserving of
protection because of his or her past actions, and (2) whether a
person is believed to pose a cognizable security threat to the
United States. Therefore, the INA provisions dealing with the ter-
rorism exception must be amended with these essential
considerations in mind.
Additionally, the responsibility of adjudication should be reas-
signed. Under the existing statutory allocation of responsibilities,
[t]he Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism in the
State Department (S/CT) continually monitors the activities
of known terrorist groups active around the world to identify
potential targets for designation. When reviewing the poten-
tial targets, S/CT looks not only at the actual attacks that a
270. See Michael T McCarthy, USA PATRIOT Act, 39 HARV.J. ON LEGIS. 435,451 (2002).
271. Darryl Fears, Conservatives Decry Terror Laws' Impact on Refugees, WASH. POST, Jan. 8,
2007, at A03 (quoting Michael Horowitz).
272. U.S. COMM'N ON INT'L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, 2006 ANNUAL REPORT 69 (2006),
http://www.uscirf.gov/countries/publications/currentreport/2006annuaRpt.pdf.
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group has carried out, but also at whether the group has en-
gaged in planning and preparation for possible future acts of
terrorism or retains the capability and intent to carry out such
acts.
2 73
The designation is made after proper consultations with the Attor-
ney General and the Department of the Treasury274 and Congress is
given a seven-day veto check on designation. In the context of an
asylum claim, however, immigration judges are given nearly free
reign in singularly deciding whether an organization is engaged in
terrorist activities using ambiguous standards. Leaving the respon-
sibility of categorizing organizations to the State Department and
its balancing counterparts assures that the assessment follows the
proper channels. This solution can be made possible by a simple
amendment to the existing law.
Currently, along with the State Department, the Attorney Gen-
eral holds power to certify an alien as a terrorist if he reasonably
believes that the person falls under any of the exclusionary
grounds contained in section 212(a) (3) (B) of the INA. Congress
tried to be careful not to extend the power of certification to any-
one other than the Attorney General and his Deputy,2 75 but
succeeded in granting overbroad authority to immigration judges
to perform almost the same duty through asylum adjudication. Just
like when immigration judges take over the State Department's du-
ties of designation, they are also required to substitute for the
Attorney General's certification duty by identifying terrorists on an
ad hoc adjudicatory basis. The failing here, however, is that immi-
gration judges do not have the same cooperative network as the
Attorney General from which to draw in making their determina-
tions. While the Attorney General may draw upon his connection
to the Department of Homeland Security, the State Department,
the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Federal Bureau of Inves-
276tigation, immigration judges are on their own. Accordingly,
Congress should consider expanding the Attorney General's au-
thority to delegate his certification power to a highly specialized
agency within his office that would certify all aliens who may meet
273. Foreign Terrorist Organizations ("FTOs"), http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/
37191.htn (last visited Nov. 7, 2007).
274. Id.
275. See8 U.S.C. § 1226a(a)(4).
276. See, e.g., Press Release, White House, Homeland Security Presidential Direc-
tive/Hspd-6 (Sept. 16, 2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
2004/08/20040827-8.html (establishing Terrorist Screening Center/Terrorist Threat Inte-
gration Center ("TrIC")) (last visited Nov. 7, 2007).
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the security criteria for certification as terrorists. Under this ar-
rangement, while certified cases would be processed by the ATRC
discussed above, uncertified cases would be processed through the
regular immigration court system. This would ensure that immigra-
tion judges adjudicate asylum claims without feeling responsible
for national security as that task would properly be performed by
the state department and the Attorney General. It is with the view
to alleviating the serious challenges outlined above that this Article
proposes the reassignment of the various responsibilities to the ap-
propriate agencies.
CONCLUSION
Since the breadth of asylum cases are so varied in terms and
scope and often lack substantial evidence that a judge could use to
determine if the asylum-seeker falls under any of the asylum excep-
tions, the safest course of conduct for an immigration judge is
often to deny asylum because the apparent risk is just too great.
There is a general fear even outside the scope of adjudicative re-
sponsibility that the asylum system will be vulnerable to abuse by
potential terrorists. Former House Judiciary Committee Chairman
James Sensenbrenner, who was responsible for the authorship of
the asylum-related provisions of the REAL ID Act, made the follow-
ing remark in support of the passage of the bill when it was still
under consideration:
There is no one who is lying through their teeth that should
be able to get relief from the courts, and I would just point
out that this bill would give immigration judges the tool to get
at the Blind Sheikh who wanted to blow up landmarks in New
York, the man who plotted and executed the bombing of the
World Trade Center in New York, the man who shot up the
entrance to the CIA headquarters in north Virginia, and the
man who shot up the El Al counter at Los Angeles Interna-
tional Airport. Every one of these non-9/11 terrorists who
tried to kill or did kill honest, law-abiding Americans was an
asylum applicant. We ought to give our judges the opportu-
nity to tell these people no and to pass the bill.
2 7
277. 151 CONG. Rac. H460 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 2005) (statement of Chairman Sensen-
brenner); see also Marisa Silenzi Cianciarulo, Terrorism and Asylum Seekers: WMy the REAL ID Act
is a False Promise, 43 HARV.J. ON LEGIS. 101, 102 (2006).
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Whether this fear is real or imagined is a subject of great contro-
versy and, as a result, responses to it have been varied. Congress
has adopted legislation, without context, that excludes from asy-
lum anyone who might remotely be considered to be a terrorist.
Therefore, the most important problem, how to differentiate be-
tween real terrorists and genuine refugees, remains. This Article
has proposed two interrelated ways of managing the uncertainty
that immigration judges face: (1) amendment of the over-inclusive
INA provisions that exclude genuine refugees from protection on
terrorism grounds where they pose no danger to the security of the
nation, and (2) the reassignment of adjudicative responsibility to
the proper authorities thereby relieving immigration judges of the
duty of adjudicating asylum cases involving terrorism cases. This
would not only strengthen the integrity of the asylum system in
general by assuring immigration judges that some other authority
is responsible for the nation's security, but would also minimize the
risk of error in two ways: (1) the certification of terrorists would be
managed by a specialized agency within the Attorney General's of-
fice and would be assisted by all the appropriate departments and
security agencies of the Federal Government, and (2) immigration
judges would adjudicate all other cases and would not be subject to
responsibility for the nation's security with respect to terrorism.
In all earnest, the existing system is not reassuring to genuine
refugees who fit certain characteristics relating to age, gender, re-
ligion and country of origin. Without implementation of genuine
legal and institutional reforms, the system designed to protect in-
dividuals from persecution and discrimination because of their
race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or social group in the
United States will continue to discriminate against many of them
precisely on these same grounds.
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